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Abstract. This paper presents Prio, a privacy-preserving
system for the collection of aggregate statistics. Each Prio
client holds a private data value (e.g., its current location),
and a small set of servers compute statistical functions
over the values of all clients (e.g., the most popular loca-
tion). As long as at least one server is honest, the Prio
servers learn nearly nothing about the clients’ private data,
except what they can infer from the aggregate statistics
that the system computes. To protect functionality in the
face of faulty or malicious clients, Prio uses secret-shared
non-interactive proofs (SNIPs), a new cryptographic tech-
nique that yields a hundred-fold performance improve-
ment over conventional zero-knowledge approaches. Prio
extends classic private aggregation techniques to enable
the collection of a large class of useful statistics. For
example, Prio can perform a least-squares regression on
high-dimensional client-provided data without ever see-
ing the data in the clear.
1 Introduction
Our smartphones, cars, and wearable electronics are con-
stantly sending telemetry data and other sensor readings
back to cloud services. With these data in hand, a cloud
service can compute useful aggregate statistics over the
entire population of devices. For example, navigation app
providers collect real-time location data from their users
to identify areas of traffic congestion in a city and route
drivers along the least-crowded roads [80]. Fitness track-
ing services collect information on their users’ physical
activity so that each user can see how her fitness regi-
men compares to the average [75]. Web browser vendors
collect lists of unusually popular homepages to detect
homepage-hijacking adware [57].
Even when a cloud service is only interested in learning
aggregate statistics about its user population as a whole,
such services often end up collecting private data from
each client and storing it for aggregation later on. These
centralized caches of private user data pose severe secu-
rity and privacy risks: motivated attackers may steal and
disclose clients’ sensitive information [84,117], cloud ser-
vices may misuse the clients’ information for profit [112],
and intelligence agencies may appropriate the data for
targeting or mass surveillance purposes [65].
This is the extended version of a paper by the same title that appeared at
NSDI 2017. This version includes additional security analysis, corrects
typos, and fixes an error in the proceedings version.
To ameliorate these threats, major technology com-
panies, including Apple [72] and Google [57, 58], have
deployed privacy-preserving systems for the collection
of user data. These systems use a “randomized response”
mechanism to achieve differential privacy [54, 118]. For
example, a mobile phone vendor may want to learn how
many of its phones have a particular uncommon but sen-
sitive app installed (e.g., the AIDSinfo app [113]). In the
simplest variant of this approach, each phone sends the
vendor a bit indicating whether it has the app installed,
except that the phone flips its bit with a fixed probability
p < 0.5. By summing a large number of these noisy bits,
the vendor can get a good estimate of the true number of
phones that are running the sensitive app.
This technique scales very well and is robust even if
some of the phones are malicious—each phone can influ-
ence the final sum by ±1 at most. However, randomized-
response-based systems provide relatively weak privacy
guarantees: every bit that each phone transmits leaks
some private user information to the vendor. In particular,
when p = 0.1 the vendor has a good chance of seeing the
correct (unflipped) user response. Increasing the noise
level p decreases this leakage, but adding more noise also
decreases the accuracy of the vendor’s final estimate. As
an example, assume that the vendor collects randomized
responses from one million phones using p = 0.49, and
that 1% of phones have the sensitive app installed. Even
with such a large number of responses, the vendor will
incorrectly conclude that no phones have the app installed
roughly one third of the time.
An alternative approach to the data-collection problem
is to have the phones send encryptions of their bits to a
set of servers. The servers can sum up the encrypted bits
and decrypt only the final sum [48, 56, 81, 92, 99, 100].
As long as all servers do not collude, these encryption-
based systems provide much stronger privacy guarantees:
the system leaks nothing about a user’s private bit to the
vendor, except what the vendor can infer from the final
sum. By carefully adding structured noise to the final
sum, these systems can provide differential privacy as
well [56, 92, 107].
However, in gaining this type of privacy, many secret-
sharing-based systems sacrifice robustness: a malicious
client can send the servers an encryption of a large integer
value v instead of a zero/one bit. Since the client’s value
v is encrypted, the servers cannot tell from inspecting the
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ciphertext that v > 1. Using this approach, a single mali-
cious client can increase the final sum by v, instead of by 1.
Clients often have an incentive to cheat in this way: an
app developer could use this attack to boost the perceived
popularity of her app, with the goal of getting it to appear
on the app store’s home page. It is possible to protect
against these attacks using zero-knowledge proofs [107],
but these protections destroy scalability: checking the
proofs requires heavy public-key cryptographic opera-
tions at the servers and can increase the servers’ workload
by orders of magnitude.
In this paper, we introduce Prio, a system for private
aggregation that resolves the tension between privacy,
robustness, and scalability. Prio uses a small number of
servers; as long as one of the Prio servers is honest, the
system leaks nearly nothing about clients’ private data (in
a sense we precisely define), except what the aggregate
statistic itself reveals. In this sense, Prio provides a strong
form of cryptographic privacy. This property holds even
against an adversary who can observe the entire network,
control all but one of the servers, and control a large
number of clients.
Prio also maintains robustness in the presence of an
unbounded number of malicious clients, since the Prio
servers can detect and reject syntactically incorrect client
submissions in a privacy-preserving way. For instance, a
car cannot report a speed of 100,000 km/h if the system
parameters only allow speeds between 0 and 200 km/h.
Of course, Prio cannot prevent a malicious client from
submitting an untruthful data value: for example, a faulty
car can always misreport its actual speed.
To provide robustness, Prio uses a new technique that
we call secret-shared non-interactive proofs (SNIPs).
When a client sends an encoding of its private data to the
Prio servers, the client also sends to each server a “share”
of a proof of correctness. Even if the client is malicious
and the proof shares are malformed, the servers can use
these shares to collaboratively check—without ever see-
ing the client’s private data in the clear—that the client’s
encoded submission is syntactically valid. These proofs
rely only upon fast, information-theoretic cryptography,
and require the servers to exchange only a few hundred
bytes of information to check each client’s submission.
Prio provides privacy and robustness without sacrific-
ing scalability. When deployed on a collection of five
servers spread around the world and configured to com-
pute private sums over vectors of private client data, Prio
imposes a 5.7× slowdown over a naïve data-collection
system that provides no privacy guarantees whatsoever.
In contrast, a state-of-the-art comparison system that uses
client-generated non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs
of correctness (NIZKs) [22, 103] imposes a 267× slow-
down at the servers. Prio improves client performance as
well: it is 50-100× faster than NIZKs and we estimate
that it is three orders of magnitude faster than methods
based on succinct non-interactive arguments of knowl-
edge (SNARKs) [16,62,97]. The system is fast in absolute
terms as well: when configured up to privately collect the
distribution of responses to a survey with 434 true/false
questions, the client performs only 26 ms of computation,
and our distributed cluster of Prio servers can process
each client submission in under 2 ms on average.
Contributions. In this paper, we:
• introduce secret-shared non-interactive proofs (SNIPs),
a new type of information-theoretic zero-knowledge
proof, optimized for the client/server setting,
• present affine-aggregatable encodings, a framework
that unifies many data-encoding techniques used in
prior work on private aggregation, and
• demonstrate how to combine these encodings with
SNIPs to provide robustness and privacy in a large-
scale data-collection system.
With Prio, we demonstrate that data-collection systems
can simultaneously achieve strong privacy, robustness to
faulty clients, and performance at scale.
2 System goals
A Prio deployment consists of a small number of infras-
tructure servers and a very large number of clients. In
each time epoch, every client i in the system holds a
private value xi. The goal of the system is to allow the
servers to compute f (x1, . . . , xn), for some aggregation
function f , in a way that leaks as little as possible about
each client’s private xi values to the servers.
Threat model. The parties to a Prio deployment must
establish pairwise authenticated and encrypted channels.
Towards this end, we assume the existence of a public-
key infrastructure and the basic cryptographic primitives
(CCA-secure public-key encryption [43, 108, 109], digital
signatures [71], etc.) that make secure channels possible.
We make no synchrony assumptions about the network:
the adversary may drop or reorder packets on the network
at will, and the adversary may monitor all links in the net-
work. Low-latency anonymity systems, such as Tor [51],
provide no anonymity in this setting, and Prio does not
rely on such systems to protect client privacy.
Security properties. Prio protects client privacy as long
as at least one server is honest. Prio provides robust-
ness (correctness) only if all servers are honest. We sum-
marize our security definitions here, but please refer to
Appendix A for details.
Anonymity. A data-collection scheme maintains client
anonymity if the adversary cannot tell which honest client
submitted which data value through the system, even
if the adversary chooses the honest clients’ data values,
controls all other clients, and controls all but one server.
Prio always protects client anonymity.
Privacy. Prio provides f -privacy, for an aggregation func-
tion f , if an adversary, who controls any number of clients
and all but one server, learns nothing about the honest
clients’ values xi, except what she can learn from the value
f (x1, . . . , xn) itself. More precisely, given f (x1, . . . , xn),
every adversary controlling a proper subset of the servers,
along with any number of clients, can simulate its view
of the protocol run.
For many of the aggregation functions f that Prio im-
plements, Prio provides strict f -privacy. For some ag-
gregation functions, which we highlight in Section 5,
Prio provides fˆ -privacy, where fˆ is a function that out-
puts slightly more information than f . More precisely,
fˆ (x1, . . . , xn) =
〈
f (x1, . . . , xn), L(x1, . . . , xn)
〉
for some
modest leakage function L.
Prio does not natively provide differential privacy [54],
since the system adds no noise to the aggregate statistics
it computes. In Section 7, we discuss when differential
privacy may be useful and how we can extend Prio to
provide it.
Robustness. A private aggregation system is robust if a
coalition of malicious clients can affect the output of the
system only by misreporting their private data values; a
coalition of malicious clients cannot otherwise corrupt the
system’s output. For example, if the function f (x1, . . . , xn)
counts the number of times a certain string appears in the
set {x1, . . . , xn}, then a single malicious client should be
able to affect the count by at most one.
Prio is robust only against adversarial clients—not
against adversarial servers. Although providing robust-
ness against malicious servers seems desirable at first
glance, doing so would come at privacy and performance
costs, which we discuss in Appendix B. Since there could
be millions of clients in a Prio deployment, and only a
handful of servers (in fixed locations with known admin-
istrators), it may also be possible to eject faulty servers
using out-of-band means.
3 A simple scheme
Let us introduce Prio by first presenting a simplified ver-
sion of it. In this simple version, each client holds a
one-bit integer xi and the servers want to compute the
sum of the clients’ private values
∑
i xi. Even this very
basic functionality has many real-world applications. For
example, the developer of a health data mobile app could
use this scheme to collect the number of app users who
have a certain medical condition. In this application, the
bit xi would indicate whether the user has the condition,
and the sum over the xis gives the count of affected users.
The public parameters for the Prio deployment include
a prime p. Throughout this paper, when we write “c =
a+b ∈ Fp,” we mean “c = a+b (mod p).” The simplified
Prio scheme for computing sums proceeds in three steps:
1. Upload. Each client i splits its private value xi
into s shares, one per server, using a secret-sharing
scheme. In particular, the client picks random inte-
gers [xi]1, . . . , [xi]s ∈ Fp, subject to the constraint:
xi = [xi]1 + · · · + [xi]s ∈ Fp. The client then sends,
over an encrypted and authenticated channel, one
share of its submission to each server.
2. Aggregate. Each server j holds an accumulator
value A j ∈ Fp, initialized to zero. Upon receiving a
share from the ith client, the server adds the uploaded
share into its accumulator: A j ← A j + [xi] j ∈ Fp.
3. Publish. Once the servers have received a share
from each client, they publish their accumulator val-
ues. Computing the sum of the accumulator val-
ues
∑
j A j ∈ Fp yields the desired sum ∑i xi of the
clients’ private values, as long as the modulus p is
larger than the number of clients (i.e., the sum
∑
i xi
does not “overflow” the modulus).
There are two observations we can make about this
scheme. First, even this simple scheme provides privacy:
the servers learn the sum
∑
i xi but they learn nothing else
about the clients’ private inputs. Second, the scheme does
not provide robustness. A single malicious client can
completely corrupt the protocol output by submitting (for
example), a random integer r ∈ Fp to each server.
The core contributions of Prio are to improve this basic
scheme in terms of security and functionality. In terms
of security, Prio extends the simple scheme to provide
robustness in the face of malicious clients. In terms of
functionality, Prio extends the simple scheme to allow
privacy-preserving computation of a wide array of aggre-
gation functions (not just sum).
4 Protecting correctness with SNIPs
Upon receiving shares of a client’s data value, the Prio
servers need a way to check if the client-submitted value
is well formed. For example, in the simplified protocol
of Section 3, every client is supposed to send the servers
the share of a value x such that 0 ≤ x ≤ 1. However,
since the client sends only a single share of its value x to
each server—to preserve privacy—each server essentially
receives an encrypted version of x and cannot unilaterally
determine if x is well formed. In the more general setting,
each Prio client submits to each server a share [x]i of a
vector x ∈ FL, for some finite field F. The servers hold a
validation predicate Valid(·), and should only accept the
client’s data submission if Valid(x) = 1 (Figure 1).
(a) The client sends a share of
its encoded submission and SNIP
proof to each server.
x1 x2 x3   …    xn
Verify
(b) The servers validate the client’s
SNIP proof to ensure that the sub-
mission is valid.
OK✓
(c) If the checks pass, the servers
update their local accumulators
with the client-provided data.
f(x
1
, …, x
n
)
(d) After accumulating many pack-
ets, the servers publish their accu-
mulators to reveal the aggregate.
Figure 1: An overview of the Prio pipeline for processing client submissions.
To execute this check in Prio, we introduce a new cryp-
tographic tool called secret-shared non-interactive proofs
(“SNIPs”). With these proofs, the client can quickly prove
to the servers that Valid(x) = 1, for an arbitrary function
Valid, without leaking anything else about x to the servers.
Building blocks. All arithmetic in this section takes place
in a finite field F, or modulo a prime p, if you prefer. We
use a simple additive secret-sharing scheme over F: to
split a value x ∈ F into s shares, choose random values
([x]1, . . . , [x]s) ∈ Fs subject to the constraint that x =∑
i[x]i ∈ F. In our notation, [x]i denotes the ith share of x.
An adversary who gets hold of any subset of up to s − 1
shares of x learns nothing, in an information-theoretic
sense, about x from the shares.
This secret-sharing scheme is linear, which means that
the servers can perform affine operations on shares with-
out communicating. That is, by adding shares [x]i and
[y]i, the servers can locally construct shares [x+y]i. Given
a share [x]i, the servers can also construct shares [αx+β]i,
for any constants α, β ∈ F. (This is a classic observation
from the multi-party computation literature [15].)
Our construction uses arithmetic circuits. An arith-
metic circuit is like a boolean circuit except that it uses
finite-field multiplication, addition, and multiplication-
by-constant gates, instead of boolean and, or, and not
gates. See Appendix C.1 for a formal definition.
4.1 Overview
A secret-shared non-interactive proof (SNIP) protocol
consists of an interaction between a client (the prover)
and multiple servers (the verifiers). At the start of the
protocol:
– each server i holds a vector [x]i ∈ FL,
– the client holds the vector x =
∑
i[x]i ∈ FL, and
– all parties hold an arithmetic circuit representing a
predicate Valid : FL → F.
The client’s goal is to convince the servers that Valid(x) =
1, without leaking anything else about x to the servers. To
do so, the client sends a proof string to each server. After
receiving these proof strings, the servers gossip amongst
themselves and then conclude either that Valid(x) = 1
(the servers “accept x”) or not (the servers “reject x”).
For a SNIP to be useful in Prio, it must satisfy the
following properties:
Correctness. If all parties are honest, the servers will
accept x.
Soundness. If all servers are honest, and if Valid(x) , 1,
then for all malicious clients, even ones running in
super-polynomial time, the servers will reject x with
overwhelming probability. In other words, no matter
how the client cheats, the servers will almost always
reject x.
Zero knowledge. If the client and at least one server are
honest, then the servers learn nothing about x, except
that Valid(x) = 1. More precisely, there exists a sim-
ulator (that does not take x as input) that accurately
reproduces the view of any proper subset of malicious
servers executing the SNIP protocol.
See Appendix D for formal definitions.
These three security properties are nearly identical to
the properties required of a zero-knowledge interactive
proof system [70]. However, in the conventional zero-
knowledge setting, there is a single prover and single
verifier, whereas here we have a single prover (the client)
and many verifiers (the servers).
Our contribution. We devise a SNIP that requires minimal
server-to-server communication, is compatible with any
public Valid circuit, and relies solely on fast, information-
theoretic primitives. (We discuss how to hide the Valid
circuit from the client in Section 4.4.)
To build the SNIP, we first generalize a “batch veri-
fication” technique of Ben-Sasson et al. [19] and then
show how a set of servers can use it to verify an entire
circuit computation by exchanging a only few field ele-
ments. We implement this last step with a new adaptation
of Beaver’s multi-party computation (MPC) protocol to
the client/server setting [9].
Related techniques. Prior work has studied interactive
proofs in both the many-prover [14,60] and many-verifier
settings [1, 10]. Prior many-verifier protocols require rel-
atively expensive public-key primitives [1] or require an
amount of server-to-server traffic that grows linearly in
the size of the circuit for the Valid function [10]. In con-
current independent work, Boyle et al. [25] construct what
we can view as a very efficient SNIP for a specific Valid
function, in which the servers are semi-honest (“honest
but curious”) [25]. They also use a Beaver-style MPC mul-
tiplication; their techniques otherwise differ from ours.
4.2 Constructing SNIPs
To run the SNIP protocol, the client and servers execute
the following steps:
Set-up. Let M be the number of multiplication gates in
the arithmetic circuit for Valid. We work over a field F
that is large enough to ensure that 2M + 2  |F|.
Step 1: Client evaluation. The client evaluates the Valid
circuit on its input x. The client thus knows the value that
every wire in the circuit takes on during the computation
of Valid(x). The client uses these wire values to construct
three randomized polynomials f , g, and h, which encode
the values on the input and output wires of each of the M
multiplication gates in the Valid(x) computation.
Label the M multiplication gates in the Valid(x) cir-
cuit, in topological order from inputs to outputs, with the
numbers {1, . . . ,M}. For t ∈ {1, . . . ,M}, let us define ut
and vt to be the values on the left and right input wires
of the t-th multiplication gate. The client chooses u0 and
v0 to be values sampled independently and uniformly at
random from F. Then, define f and g to be the lowest-
degree polynomials such that f (t) = ut and g(t) = vt,
for all t ∈ {0, . . . ,M}. Finally, define the polynomial h
as h = f · g.
The polynomials f and g will have degree at most M,
and the polynomial h will have degree at most 2M. Since
h(t) = f (t) · g(t) = ut · vt for all t ∈ {1, . . . ,M}, h(t) is
equal to the value of the output wire (ut · vt) of the t-th
multiplication gate in the Valid(x) circuit, for 1 ≤ t ≤ M.
In Step 1 of the checking protocol, the client executes
the computation of Valid(x), uses polynomial interpola-
tion to construct the polynomials f and g, and multiplies
these polynomials to produce h = f · g. The client then
splits the random values f (0) = u0 and g(0) = v0, using
additive secret sharing, and send shares [ f (0)]i and [g(0)]i
to server i. The client also splits the coefficients of h and
sends the ith share of the coefficients [h]i to server i.
Step 2: Consistency checking at the servers. Each
server i holds a share [x]i of the client’s private value x.
Each server also holds shares [ f (0)]i, [g(0)]i, and [h]i.
Using these values, each server can—without communi-
cating with the other servers—produce shares [ f ]i and
[g]i of the polynomials f and g.
To see how, first observe that if a server has a share of
every wire value in the circuit, along with shares of f (0)
and g(0), it can construct [ f ]i and [g]i using polynomial
interpolation. Next, realize that each server can recon-
struct a share of every wire value in the circuit since each
server:
• has a share of each of the input wire values ([x]i),
• has a share of each wire value coming out of a multi-
plication gate (for t ∈ {1, . . . ,M}, the value [h]i(t) is
a share of the t-th such wire), and
• can derive all other wire value shares via affine oper-
ations on the wire value shares it already has.
Using these wire value shares, the servers use polynomial
interpolation to construct [ f ]i and [g]i.
If the client and servers have acted honestly up to this
point, then the servers will now hold shares of polynomi-
als f , g, and h such that f · g = h.
In contrast, a malicious client could have sent the
servers shares of a polynomial hˆ such that, for some
t ∈ {1, . . . ,M}, hˆ(t) is not the value on the output wire in
the t-th multiplication gate of the Valid(x) computation.
In this case, the servers will reconstruct shares of poly-
nomials fˆ and gˆ that might not be equal to f and g. We
will then have with certainty that hˆ , fˆ · gˆ. To see why,
consider the least t0 for which hˆ(t0) , h(t0). For all t ≤ t0,
fˆ (t) = f (t) and gˆ(t) = g(t), by construction. Since
hˆ(t0) , h(t0) = f (t0) · g(t0) = fˆ (t0) · gˆ(t0),
it must be that hˆ(t0) , fˆ (t0) · gˆ(t0), so hˆ , fˆ · gˆ. (Ben-
Sasson et al. [19] use polynomial identities to check the
consistency of secret-shared values in a very different
MPC protocol. Their construction inspired our approach.)
Step 3a: Polynomial identity test. At the start of this
step, each server i holds shares [ fˆ ]i, [gˆ]i, and [hˆ]i of poly-
nomials fˆ , gˆ, and hˆ. Furthermore, it holds that fˆ · gˆ = hˆ
if and only if the servers collectively hold a set of wire
value shares that, when summed up, equal the internal
wire values of the Valid(x) circuit computation.
The servers now execute a variant of the Schwartz-
Zippel randomized polynomial identity test [104, 126]
to check whether this relation holds. The principle of
the test is that if fˆ (t) · gˆ(t) , hˆ(t), then the polynomial
t · ( fˆ (t) · gˆ(t) − hˆ(t)) is a non-zero polynomial of degree at
most 2M + 1. (Multiplying the polynomial fˆ · g − hˆ by t
is useful for the next step.) Such a polynomial can have at
most 2M + 1 zeros in F, so if we choose a random r ∈ F
and evaluate r · ( fˆ (r) · gˆ(r) − hˆ(r)), the servers will detect
that fˆ · gˆ , hˆ with probability at least 1 − 2M+1|F| .
To execute the polynomial identity test, one of the
servers samples a random value r ∈ F. Each server i then
evaluates her share of each of the three polynomials on
the point r to get [ fˆ (r)]i, [gˆ(r)]i, and [hˆ(r)]i. The servers
can perform this step locally, since polynomial evaluation
requires only affine operations on shares. Each server then
applies a local linear operation to these last two shares to
produce shares of [r · gˆ(r)]i, and [r · hˆ(r)]i.
Assume for a moment that each server i can multi-
ply her shares [ fˆ (r)]i and [r · gˆ(r)]i to produce a share
[r · fˆ (r) · gˆ(r)]i. In this case, the servers can use a linear
operation to get shares σi = [r · ( fˆ (r) · gˆ(r) − hˆ(r))]i.
The servers then publish these σis and ensure that∑
i σi = 0 ∈ F. The servers reject the client’s submission
if
∑
i σi , 0.
Step 3b: Multiplication of shares. Finally, the servers
must somehow multiply their shares [ fˆ (r)]i and [r · gˆ(r)]i
to get a share [r · fˆ (r) · gˆ(r)]i without leaking anything
to each other about the values fˆ (r) and gˆ(r). To do so,
we adapt a multi-party computation (MPC) technique of
Beaver [9]. The details of Beaver’s MPC protocol are
not critical here, but we include them for reference in
Appendix C.2.
Beaver’s result implies that if servers receive, from a
trusted dealer, one-time-use shares ([a]i, [b]i, [c]i) ∈ F3 of
random values such that a · b = c ∈ F (“multiplication
triples”), then the servers can very efficiently execute a
multi-party multiplication of a pair secret-shared values.
Furthermore, the multiplication protocol is fast: it requires
each server to broadcast a single message.
In the traditional MPC setting, the parties to the com-
putation have to run an expensive cryptographic protocol
to generate the multiplication triples themselves [46]. In
our setting however, the client generates the multiplica-
tion triple on behalf of the servers: the client chooses
(a, b, c) ∈ F3 such that a · b = c ∈ F, and sends shares of
these values to each server. If the client produces shares
of these values correctly, then the servers can perform
a multi-party multiplication of shares to complete the
correctness check of the prior section.
Crucially, we can ensure that even if the client sends
shares of an invalid multiplication triple to the servers,
the servers will still catch the cheating client with high
probability. First, say that a cheating client sends the
servers shares ([a]i, [b]i, [c]i) ∈ F3 such that a · b , c ∈ F.
Then we can write a · b = (c + α) ∈ F, for some constant
α > 0.
In this case, when the servers run Beaver’s MPC mul-
tiplication protocol to execute the polynomial identity
test, the result of the test will be shifted by α. (To con-
firm this, consult our summary of Beaver’s protocol in
Appendix C.2.) So the servers will effectively testing
whether the polynomial
Pˆ(t) = t · ( fˆ (t) · gˆ(t) − hˆ(t)) + α
is identically zero. Whenever fˆ · gˆ , hˆ, it holds that
t · ( fˆ (t) · gˆ(t) − hˆ(t)) is a non-zero polynomial. So, if
fˆ · gˆ , hˆ, then Pˆ(t) must also be a non-zero polynomial.
(In constructing Pˆ, We multiply the term “ fˆ · gˆ − hˆ” by t,
to ensure that whenever this expression is non-zero, the
resulting polynomial Pˆ is non-zero, even if fˆ , gˆ, and hˆ
are degree-zero polynomials, and the client chooses α
adversarially.)
Since we only require soundness to hold if all servers
are honest, we may assume that the client did not know
the servers’ random value r when the client generated
its multiplication triple. This implies that r is distributed
independently of α, and since we only require soundness
to hold if the servers are honest, we may assume that r is
sampled uniformly from F as well.
So, even if the client cheats, the servers will still be
executing the polynomial identity test on a non-zero poly-
nomial of degree at most 2M + 1. The servers will thus
catch a cheating client with probability at least 1 − 2M+1|F| .
In Appendix D.1, we present a formal definition of the
soundness property and we prove that it holds.
Step 4: Output verification. If all servers are hon-
est, at the start of the final step of the protocol, each
server i will hold a set of shares of the values that the
Valid circuit takes on during computation of Valid(x):
([w1]i, [w2]i, . . . ). The servers already hold shares of
the input wires of this circuit ([x]i), so to confirm that
Valid(x) = 1, the servers need only publish their shares of
the output wire. When they do, the servers can sum up
these shares to confirm that the value on the output wire
is equal to one, in which case it must be that Valid(x) = 1,
except with some small failure probability due to the poly-
nomial identity test.
Combining all of the pieces above: each share of a
SNIP proof consists of a share of the client-produced
tuple pi = ( f (0), g(0), h, a, b, c).
4.3 Security and efficiency
The correctness of the scheme follows by construction. To
trick the servers into accepting a malformed submission,
a cheating client must subvert the polynomial identity test.
This bad event has probability at most (2M+1)/|F|, where
M is the number of multiplication gates in Valid(·). By
taking |F| ≈ 2128, or repeating Step 3 a few times, we can
make this failure probability extremely small.
We require neither completeness nor soundness to hold
in the presence of malicious servers, though we do require
soundness against malicious clients. A malicious server
can thus trick the honest servers into rejecting a well-
formed client submission that they should have accepted.
This is tantamount to the malicious server mounting a
selective denial-of-service attack against the honest client.
We discuss this attack in Section 7.
We prove in Appendix D.2 that, as long as there is
at least one honest server, the dishonest servers gain no
information—in an unconditional, information-theoretic
sense—about the client’s data values nor about the values
on the internal wires in the Valid(x) circuit.
NIZK SNARK Prio (SNIP)
C
lie
nt Exps. M M 0
Muls. 0 M log M M log M
Proof len. M 1 M
Se
rv
er
s Exps./Pairs. M 1 0
Muls. 0 M M log M
Data transfer M 1 1
Table 2: An asymptotic comparison of Prio with standard zero-
knowledge techniques showing that Prio reduces the computa-
tional burden for clients and servers. The client holds a vector
x ∈ FM , each server i holds a share [x]i, and the client convinces
the servers that each component of x is a 0/1 value in F. We
suppress the Θ(·) notation for readability.
Efficiency. The remarkable property of this SNIP con-
struction is that the server-to-server communication cost
grows neither with the complexity of the verification cir-
cuit nor with the size of the value x (Table 2). The compu-
tation cost at the servers is essentially the same as the cost
for each server to evaluate the Valid circuit locally. That
said, the client-to-server communication cost does grow
linearly with the size of the Valid circuit. An interesting
challenge would be to try to reduce the client’s bandwidth
usage without resorting to relatively expensive public-key
cryptographic techniques [17, 18, 26, 41, 97].
4.4 Computation at the servers
Constructing the SNIP proof requires the client to com-
pute Valid(x) on its own. If the verification circuit takes
secret server-provided values as input, or is itself a secret
belonging to the servers, then the client does not have
enough information to compute Valid(x). For example,
the servers could run a proprietary verification algorithm
to detect spammy client submissions—the servers would
want to run this algorithm without revealing it to the (pos-
sibly spam-producing) clients. To handle this use case,
the servers can execute the verification check themselves
at a slightly higher cost.
This variant maintains privacy only against “honest
but curious” servers—in contrast, the SNIP-based variant
maintains privacy against actively malicious servers. See
Appendix E for details.
5 Gathering complex statistics
So far, we have developed the means to compute private
sums over client-provided data (Section 3) and to check
an arbitrary validation predicate against secret-shared data
(Section 4). Combining these two ideas with careful data
encodings, which we introduce now, allows Prio to com-
pute more sophisticated statistics over private client data.
At a high level, each client first encodes its private data
value in a prescribed way, and the servers then privately
compute the sum of the encodings. Finally, the servers
can decode the summed encodings to recover the statistic
of interest. The participants perform this encoding and
decoding via a mechanism we call affine-aggregatable
encodings (“AFEs”).
5.1 Affine-aggregatable encodings (AFEs)
In our setting, each client i holds a value xi ∈ D, where
D is some set of data values. The servers hold an ag-
gregation function f : Dn → A, whose range is a set of
aggregatesA. For example, the function f might compute
the standard deviation of its n inputs. The servers’ goal is
to evaluate f (x1, . . . , xn) without learning the xis.
An AFE gives an efficient way to encode the data
values xi such that it is possible to compute the value
f (x1, . . . , xn) given only the sum of the encodings of
x1, . . . , xn. An AFE consists of three efficient algorithms
(Encode,Valid,Decode), defined with respect to a field F
and two integers k and k′, where k′ ≤ k:
• Encode(x): maps an input x ∈ D to its encoding in Fk,
• Valid(y): returns true if and only if y ∈ Fk is a valid
encoding of some data item in D,
• Decode(σ): takes σ = ∑ni=1 Trunck′(Encode(xi)) ∈ Fk′
as input, and outputs f (x1, . . . , xn). The Trunck′ (·) func-
tion outputs the first k′ ≤ k components of its input.
The AFE uses all k components of the encoding in valida-
tion, but only uses k′ components to decode σ. In many
of our applications we have k′ = k.
An AFE is private with respect to a function fˆ , or sim-
ply fˆ -private, ifσ reveals nothing about x1, . . . , xn beyond
what fˆ (x1, . . . , xn) itself reveals. More precisely, it is pos-
sible to efficiently simulate σ given only fˆ (x1, . . . , xn).
Usually fˆ reveals nothing more than the aggregation func-
tion f (i.e., the minimum leakage possible), but in some
cases fˆ reveals a little more than f .
For some functions f we can build more efficient f -
private AFEs by allowing the encoding algorithm to be
randomized. In these cases, we allow the decoding algo-
rithm to return an answer that is only an approximation of
f , and we also allow it to fail with some small probability.
Prior systems have made use of specific AFEs for
sums [56, 86], standard deviations [100], counts [28, 92],
and least-squares regression [82]. Our contribution is to
unify these notions and to adopt existing AFEs to enable
better composition with Prio’s SNIPs. In particular, by
using more complex encodings, we can reduce the size of
the circuit for Valid, which results in shorter SNIP proofs.
AFEs in Prio: Putting it all together. The full Prio
system computes f (x1, . . . , xn) privately as follows (see
Figure 1): Each client encodes its data value x using the
AFE Encode routine for the aggregation function f . Then,
as in the simple scheme of Section 3, every client splits
its encoding into s shares and sends one share to each of
the s servers. The client uses a SNIP proof (Section 4) to
convince the servers that its encoding satisfies the AFE
Valid predicate.
Upon receiving a client’s submission, the servers ver-
ify the SNIP to ensure that the encoding is well-formed.
If the servers conclude that the encoding is valid, every
server adds the first k′ components of the encoding share
to its local running accumulator. (Recall that k′ is a pa-
rameter of the AFE scheme.) Finally, after collecting
valid submissions from many clients, every server pub-
lishes its local accumulator, enabling anyone to run the
AFE Decode routine to compute the final statistic in the
clear. The formal description of the system is presented
in Appendix H, where we also analyze its security.
Limitations. There exist aggregation functions for which
all AFE constructions must have large encodings. For
instance, say that each of n clients holds an integer xi,
where 1 ≤ xi ≤ n. We might like an AFE that computes
the median of these integers {x1, . . . , xn}, working over a
field F with |F| ≈ nd, for some constant d ≥ 1.
We show that there is no such AFE whose encodings
consist of k′ ∈ o(n/ log n) field elements. Suppose, to-
wards a contradiction, that such an AFE did exist. Then
we could describe any sum of encodings using at most
O(k′ log |F|) = o(n) bits of information. From this AFE,
we could build a single-pass, space-o(n) streaming algo-
rithm for computing the exact median of an n-item stream.
But every single-pass streaming algorithm for computing
the exact median over an n-item stream requires Ω(n) bits
of space [74], which is a contradiction. Similar arguments
may rule out space-efficient AFE constructions for other
natural functions.
5.2 Aggregating basic data types
This section presents the basic affine-aggregatable encod-
ing schemes that serve as building blocks for the more
sophisticated schemes. In the following constructions, the
clients hold data values x1, . . . , xn ∈ D, and our goal is to
compute an aggregate f (x1, . . . , xn).
In constructing these encodings, we have two goals.
The first is to ensure that the AFE leaks as little as possible
about the xis, apart from the value f (x1, . . . , xn) itself. The
second is to minimize the number of multiplication gates
in the arithmetic circuit for Valid, since the cost of the
SNIPs grows with this quantity.
In what follows, we let λ be a security parameter, such
as λ = 80 or λ = 128.
Integer sum and mean. We first construct an AFE for
computing the sum of b-bit integers. Let F be a finite
field of size at least n2b. On input 0 ≤ x ≤ 2b − 1, the
Encode(x) algorithm first computes the bit representation
of x, denoted (β0, β1, . . . , βb−1) ∈ {0, 1}b. It then treats the
binary digits as elements of F, and outputs
Encode(x) = (x, β0, . . . , βb−1) ∈ Fb+1.
To check that x represents a b-bit integer, the Valid
algorithm ensures that each βi is a bit, and that the bits
represent x. Specifically, the algorithm checks that the
following equalities hold over F:
Valid(Encode(x)) =
(
x =
b−1∑
i=0
2iβi
)
∧
n∧
i=1
[
(βi−1) ·βi = 0
]
.
The Decode algorithm takes the sum of encodings σ
as input, truncated to only the first coordinate. That is,
σ =
∑n
i=1 Trunc1
(
Encode(x1)
)
= x1 + · · · + xn. This σ
is the required aggregate output. Moreover, this AFE is
clearly sum-private.
To compute the arithmetic mean, we divide the sum of
integers by n over the rationals. Computing the product
and geometric mean works in exactly the same matter,
except that we encode x using b-bit logarithms.
Variance and stddev. Using known techniques [30,
100], the summation AFE above lets us compute the
variance of a set of b-bit integers using the identity:
Var(X) = E[X2] − (E[X])2. Each client encodes its in-
teger x as (x, x2) and then applies the summation AFE to
each of the two components. (The Valid algorithm also
ensures that second integer is the square of the first.) The
resulting two values let us compute the variance.
This AFE also reveals the expectation E[X]. It is pri-
vate with respect to the function fˆ that outputs both the
expectation and variance of the given set of integers.
Boolean or and and. When D = {0, 1} and
f (x1, . . . , xn) = or(x1, . . . , xn) the encoding operation
outputs an element of Fλ2 (i.e., a λ-bit bitstring) as:
Encode(x) =
λ zeros if x = 0a random element in Fλ2 if x = 1.
The Valid algorithm outputs “1” always, since all λ-bit
encodings are valid. The sum of encodings is simply
the xor of the n λ-bit encodings. The Decode algorithm
takes as input a λ-bit string and outputs “0” if and only if
its input is a λ-bit string of zeros. With probability 1 −
2−λ, over the randomness of the encoding algorithm, the
decoding operation returns the boolean or of the encoded
values. This AFE is or-private. A similar construction
yields an AFE for boolean and.
min and max. To compute the minimum and maximum
of integers over a range {0, . . . , B − 1}, where B is small
(e.g., car speeds in the range 0–250 km/h), the Encode
algorithm can represent each integer in unary as a length-
B vector of bits (β0, . . . , βB−1), where βi = 1 if and only
if the client’s value x ≤ i. We can use the bitwise-or
construction above to take the or of the client-provided
vectors—the largest value containing a “1” is the maxi-
mum. To compute the minimum instead, replace or with
and. This is min-private, as in the or protocol above.
When the domain is large (e.g., we want the max of
64-bit packet counters, in a networking application), we
can get a c-approximation of the min and max using a
similar idea: divide the range {0, . . . , B − 1} into b =
logc B “bins” [0, c), [c, c
2), . . . , [cb−1, B). Then, use the
small-range min/max construction, over the b bins, to
compute the approximate statistic. The output will be
within a multiplicative factor of c of the true value. This
construction is private with respect to the approximate
min/max function.
Frequency count. Here, every client has a value x in a
small set of data values D = {0, . . . , B− 1}. The goal is to
output a B-element vector v, where v[i] is the number of
clients that hold the value i, for every 0 ≤ i < B.
Let F be a field of size at least n. The Encode al-
gorithm encodes a value x ∈ D as a length-B vector
(β0, . . . , βB−1) ∈ FB where βi = 1 if x = i and βi = 0
otherwise. The Valid algorithm checks that each β value
is in the set {0, 1} and that the sum of the βs is exactly one.
The Decode algorithm does nothing: the final output is a
length-B vector, whose ith component gives the number
of clients who took on value i. Again, this AFE is private
with respect to the function being computed.
The output of this AFE yields enough information to
compute other useful functions (e.g., quantiles) of the
distribution of the clients’ x values. When the domain D
is large, this AFE is very inefficient. In Appendix G, we
give AFEs for approximate counts over large domains.
Sets. We can compute the intersection or union of sets
over a small universe of elements using the boolean AFE
operations: represent a set of B items as its characteristic
vector of booleans, and compute an and for intersection
and an or for union. When the universe is large, the
approximate AFEs of Appendix G are more efficient.
5.3 Machine learning
We can use Prio for training machine learning models on
private client data. To do so, we exploit the observation of
Karr et al. [82] that a system for computing private sums
can also privately train linear models. (In Appendix G,
we also show how to use Prio to privately evaluate the
R2-coefficient of an existing model.) In Prio, we extend
their work by showing how to perform these tasks while
maintaining robustness against malicious clients.
Suppose that every client holds a data point (x, y) where
x and y are b-bit integers. We would like to train a model
that takes x as input and outputs a real-valued prediction
Workstation Phone
Field size: 87-bit 265-bit 87-bit 265-bit
Mul. in field (µs) 1.013 1.485 11.218 14.930
Prio
client
time
L = 101 0.003 0.004 0.017 0.024
L = 102 0.024 0.036 0.112 0.170
L = 103 0.221 0.344 1.059 2.165
Table 3: Time in seconds for a client to generate a Prio submis-
sion of L four-bit integers to be summed at the servers. Averaged
over eight runs.
yˆi = M(x) ∈ R of y. We might predict a person’s blood
pressure (y) from the number of steps they walk daily (x).
We wish to compute the least-squares linear fit h(x) =
c0 + c1x over all of the client points. With n clients, the
model coefficients c0 and c1 satisfy the linear relation: n ∑ni=1 xi∑n
i=1 xi
∑n
i=1 x
2
i
 · c0
c1
 =  ∑ni=1 yi∑n
i=1 xiyi
 (1)
To compute this linear system in an AFE, every client
encodes her private point (x, y) as a vector
(x, x2, y, xy, β0, . . . , βb−1, γ0, . . . , γb−1) ∈ F2b+4,
where (β0, . . . , βb−1) is the binary representation of x and
(γ0, . . . , γb−1) is the binary representation of y. The vali-
dation algorithm checks that all the β and γ are in {0, 1},
and that all the arithmetic relations hold, analogously to
the validation check for the integer summation AFE. Fi-
nally, the decoding algorithm takes as input the sum of the
encoded vectors truncated to the first four components:
σ =
( ∑n
i=1 x,
∑n
i=1 x
2,
∑n
i=1 y,
∑n
i=1 xy
)
,
from which the decoding algorithm computes the required
real regression coefficients c0 and c1 using (1). This AFE
is private with respect to the function that outputs the
least-squares fit h(x) = c0 + c1x, along with the mean and
variance of the set {x1, . . . , xn}.
When x and y are real numbers, we can embed the reals
into a finite field F using a fixed-point representation, as
long as we size the field large enough to avoid overflow.
The two-dimensional approach above generalizes di-
rectly to perform linear regression on d-dimensional fea-
ture vectors x¯ = (x(1), . . . , x(d)). The AFE yields a least-
squares approximation of the form h(x¯) = c0+c1x(1)+· · ·+
cd x(d). The resulting AFE is private with respect to a func-
tion that reveals the least-square coefficients (c0, . . . , cd),
along with the d × d covariance matrix ∑i x¯i · (x¯i)T .
6 Evaluation
In this section, we demonstrate that Prio’s theoretical
contributions translate into practical performance gains.
We have implemented a Prio prototype in 5,700 lines
of Go and 620 lines of C (for FFT-based polynomial
operations, built on the FLINT library [59]). Unless noted
otherwise, our evaluations use an FFT-friendly 87-bit field.
Our servers communicate with each other using Go’s TLS
implementation. Clients encrypt and sign their messages
to servers using NaCl’s “box” primitive, which obviates
the need for client-to-server TLS connections. Our code
is available online at https://crypto.stanford.edu/prio/.
We evaluate the SNIP-based variant of Prio (Sec-
tion 4.1) and also the variant in which the servers keep the
Valid predicate private (“Prio-MPC,” Section 4.4). Our
implementation includes three optimizations described
in Appendix I. The first uses a pseudo-random generator
(e.g., AES in counter mode) to reduce the client-to-server
data transfer by a factor of roughly s in an s-server de-
ployment. The second optimization allows the servers to
verify SNIPs without needing to perform expensive poly-
nomial interpolations. The third optimization gives an
efficient way for the servers to compute the logical-and
of multiple arithmetic circuits to check that multiple Valid
predicates hold simultaneously.
We compare Prio against a private aggregation scheme
that uses non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs (NIZKs)
to provide robustness. This protocol is similar to the
“cryptographically verifiable” interactive protocol of Kur-
sawe et al. [86] and has roughly the same cost, in terms of
exponentiations per client request, as the “distributed de-
cryption” variant of PrivEx [56]. We implement the NIZK
scheme using a Go wrapper of OpenSSL’s NIST P256
code [50]. We do not compare Prio against systems, such
as ANONIZE [76] and PrivStats [100], that rely on an
external anonymizing proxy to protect against a network
adversary. (We discuss this related work in Section 8.)
6.1 Microbenchmarks
Table 3 presents the time required for a Prio client to
encode a data submission on a workstation (2.4 GHz Intel
Xeon E5620) and mobile phone (Samsung Galaxy SIII,
1.4 GHz Cortex A9). For a submission of 100 integers,
the client time is roughly 0.03 seconds on a workstation,
and just over 0.1 seconds on a mobile phone.
To investigate the load that Prio places on the servers,
we configured five Amazon EC2 servers (eight-core
c3.2xlarge machines, Intel Xeon E5-2680 CPUs) in five
Amazon data centers (N. Va., N. Ca., Oregon, Ireland,
and Frankfurt) and had them run the Prio protocols. An
additional three c3.2xlarge machines in the N. Va. data
center simulated a large number of Prio clients. To max-
imize the load on the servers, we had each client send a
stream of pre-generated Prio data packets to the servers
over a single TCP connection. There is no need to use
TLS on the client-to-server Prio connection because Prio
packets are encrypted and authenticated at the application
layer and can be replay-protected at the servers.
Figure 4 gives the throughput of this cluster in which
each client submits a vector of zero/one integers and the
servers sum these vectors. The “No privacy” line on
the chart gives the throughput for a dummy scheme in
which a single server accepts encrypted client data sub-
missions directly from the clients with no privacy protec-
tion whatsoever. The “No robustness” line on the chart
gives the throughput for a cluster of five servers that use
a secret-sharing-based private aggregation scheme (à la
Section 3) with no robustness protection. The five-server
“No robustness” scheme is slower than the single-server
“No privacy” scheme because of the cost of coordinating
the processing of submissions amongst the five servers.
The throughput of Prio is within a factor of 5× of the
no-privacy scheme for many submission sizes, and Prio
outperforms the NIZK-based scheme by more than an
order of magnitude.
Figure 5 shows how the throughput of a Prio cluster
changes as the number of servers increases, when the sys-
tem is collecting the sum of 1,024 one-bit client-submitted
integers, as in an anonymous survey application. For this
experiment, we locate all of the servers in the same data
center, so that the latency and bandwidth between each
pair of servers is roughly constant. With more servers, an
adversary has to compromise a larger number of machines
to violate Prio’s privacy guarantees.
Adding more servers barely affects the system’s
throughput. The reason is that we are able to load-balance
the bulk of the work of checking client submissions across
all of the servers. (This optimization is only possible be-
cause we require robustness to hold only if all servers are
honest.) We assign a single Prio server to be the “leader”
that coordinates the checking of each client data submis-
sion. In processing a single submission in an s-server
cluster, the leader transmits s times more bits than a non-
leader, but as the number of servers increases, each server
is a leader for a smaller share of incoming submissions.
The NIZK-based scheme also scales well: as the num-
ber of servers increases, the heavy computational load of
checking the NIZKs is distributed over more machines.
Figure 6 shows the number of bytes each non-leader
Prio server needs to transmit to check the validity of a
single client submission for the two Prio variants, and
for the NIZK scheme. The benefit of Prio is evident:
the Prio servers transmit a constant number of bits per
submission—independent of the size of the submission
or complexity of the Valid routine. As the submitted
vectors grow, Prio yields a 4,000-fold bandwidth saving
over NIZKs, in terms of server data transfer.
24 26 28 210 212 214 216
Submission length (field elements)
1
10
100
1000
10000
Su
bm
is
si
on
s
pr
oc
es
se
d/
s
No robustness
Prio
Prio-MPC
NIZK
No privacy
Figure 4: Prio’s SNIPs provide the robustness guar-
antees of zero-knowledge proofs at 20-50× less cost.
2 4 6 8 10
Number of servers (same data center)
1
10
100
1000
Su
bm
is
si
on
s
pr
oc
es
se
d/
s
No robustness
Prio
Prio-MPC
NIZK
No privacy
Figure 5: Prio is insensitive to the
number of aggregation servers.
22 26 210 214
Submission length
(field elements)
0 KiB
4 KiB
64 KiB
1 MiB
Pe
r-
se
rv
er
da
ta
tr
an
sf
er
Pr
io-
M
PC
Prio
NI
ZK
Figure 6: Prio’s use of SNIPs (§4)
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Figure 7: Client encoding time for different application domains when using Prio, a non-interactive zero-knowledge system (NIZK),
or a SNARK-like system (estimated). Averaged over eight runs. The number of × gates in the Valid circuit is listed in parentheses.
6.2 Application scenarios
To demonstrate that Prio’s data types are expressive
enough to collect real-world aggregates, we have con-
figured Prio for a few potential application domains. Cell
signal strength. A collection of Prio servers can collect
the average mobile signal strength in each grid cell in
a city without leaking the user’s location history to the
aggregator. We divide the geographic area into a km2
grid—the number of grid cells depends on the city’s size—
and we encode the signal strength at the user’s present
location as a four-bit integer. (If each client only submits
signal-strength data for a few grid cells in each protocol
run, extra optimizations can reduce the client-to-server
data transfer. See “Share compression” in Appendix G.)
Browser statistics. The Chromium browser uses the
RAPPOR system to gather private information about its
users [35,57]. We implement a Prio instance for gather-
ing a subset of these statistics: average CPU and mem-
ory usage, along with the frequency counts of 16 URL
roots. structure, described in Appendix G. We experiment
with both low- and high-resolution parameters (δ = 2−10,
 = 1/10; δ = 2−20,  = 1/100).
Health data modeling. We implement the AFE for train-
ing a regression model on private client data. We use
the features from a preexisting heart disease data set
(13 features of varying types: age, sex, cholesterol level,
etc.) [78] and a breast cancer diagnosis data set (30 real-
valued features using 14-bit fixed-point numbers) [120].
Anonymous surveys. We configure Prio to compute ag-
gregates responses to sensitive surveys: we use the Beck
Depression Inventory (21 questions on a 1-4 scale) [4],
the Parent-Child Relationship Inventory (78 questions
on a 1-4 scale) [63], and the California Psychological
Inventory (434 boolean questions) [42].
Comparison to alternatives. In Figure 7, we compare
the computational cost Prio places on the client to the
costs of other schemes for protecting robustness against
misbehaving clients, when we configure the system for
the aforementioned applications. The fact that a Prio
client need only perform a single public-key encryption
means that it dramatically outperforms schemes based on
public-key cryptography. If the Valid circuit has M mul-
tiplication gates, producing a discrete-log-based NIZK
requires the client to perform 2M exponentiations (or
elliptic-curve point multiplications). In contrast, Prio re-
quires O(M log M) multiplications in a relatively small
field, which is much cheaper for practical values of M.
In Figure 7, we give conservative estimates of the time
required to generate a zkSNARK proof, based on timings
of libsnark’s [18] implementation of the Pinocchio sys-
tem [97] at the 128-bit security level. These proofs have
the benefit of being very short: 288 bytes, irrespective
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Figure 8: Time for a client to encode a submission
consisting of d-dimensional training example of 14-bit
values for computing a private least-squares regression.
No privacy No robustness Prio
d Rate Rate Priv. cost Rate Robust. cost Tot. cost
2 14,688 2,687 5.5× 2,608 1.0× 5.6×
4 15,426 2,569 6.0× 2,165 1.2× 7.1×
6 14,773 2,600 5.7× 2,048 1.3× 7.2×
8 15,975 2,564 6.2× 1,606 1.6× 9.5×
10 15,589 2,639 5.9× 1,430 1.8× 10.9×
12 15,189 2,547 6.0× 1,312 1.9× 11.6×
Table 9: The throughput, in client requests per second, of a global five-
server cluster running a private d-dim. regression. We compare a scheme
with no privacy, with privacy but no robustness, and Prio (with both).
of the complexity of the circuit. To realize the benefit of
these succinct proofs, the statement being proved must
also be concise since the verifier’s running time grows
with the statement size. To achieve this conciseness in the
Prio setting would require computing sL hashes “inside
the SNARK,” with s servers and submissions of length L.
We optimistically estimate that each hash computation
requires only 300 multiplication gates, using a subset-sum
hash function [2, 17, 67, 77], and we ignore the cost of
computing the Valid circuit in the SNARK. We then use
the timings from the libsnark paper to arrive at the cost
estimates. Each SNARK multiplication gate requires the
client to compute a number of exponentiations, so the cost
to the client is large, though the proof is admirably short.
6.3 Machine learning
Finally, we perform an end-to-end evaluation of Prio when
the system is configured to train a d-dimensional least-
squares regression model on private client-submitted data,
in which each training example consists of a vector of 14-
bit integers. These integers are large enough to represent
vital health information, for example.
In Figure 8, we show the client encoding cost for Prio,
along with the no-privacy and no-robustness schemes de-
scribed in Section 6.1. The cost of Prio’s privacy and
robustness guarantees amounts to roughly a 50× slow-
down at the client over the no-privacy scheme due to the
overhead of the SNIP proof generation. Even so, the ab-
solute cost of Prio to the client is small—on the order of
one tenth of a second.
Table 9 gives the rate at which the globally distributed
five-server cluster described in Section 6.1 can process
client submissions with and without privacy and robust-
ness. The server-side cost of Prio is modest: only a 1-2×
slowdown over the no-robustness scheme, and only a 5-
15× slowdown over a scheme with no privacy at all. In
contrast, the cost of robustness for the state-of-the-art
NIZK schemes, per Figure 4, is closer to 100-200×.
7 Discussion
Deployment scenarios. Prio ensures client privacy as
long as at least one server behaves honestly. We now
discuss a number of deployment scenarios in which this
assumption aligns with real-world incentives.
Tolerance to compromise. Prio lets an organization com-
pute aggregate data about its clients without ever storing
client data in a single vulnerable location. The organiza-
tion could run all s Prio servers itself, which would en-
sures data privacy against an attacker who compromises
up to s − 1 servers.
App store. A mobile application platform (e.g., Apple’s
App Store or Google’s Play) can run one Prio server, and
the developer of a mobile app can run the second Prio
server. This allows the app developer to collect aggregate
user data without having to bear the risks of holding these
data in the clear.
Shared data. A group of s organizations could use Prio to
compute an aggregate over the union of their customers’
datasets, without learning each other’s private client data.
Private compute services. A large enterprise can contract
with an external auditor or a non-profit (e.g., the Elec-
tronic Frontier Foundation) to jointly compute aggregate
statistics over sensitive customer data using Prio.
Jurisdictional diversity. A multinational organization can
spread its Prio servers across different countries. If law
enforcement agents seize the Prio servers in one country,
they cannot deanonymize the organization’s Prio users.
Common attacks. Two general attacks apply to all sys-
tems, like Prio, that produce exact (un-noised) outputs
while protecting privacy against a network adversary.
The first attack is a selective denial-of-service attack.
In this attack, the network adversary prevents all hon-
est clients except one from being able to contact the
Prio servers [105]. In this case, the protocol output is
f (xhonest, xevil1 , . . . , xeviln ). Since the adversary knows the
xevil values, the adversary could infer part or all of the one
honest client’s private value xhonest.
(a) RAPPOR [57] provides differential pri-
vacy [54] (not information-theoretic privacy)
by adding random noise to client submissions.
(b) ANONIZE [76] and PrivStats [100] rely
on an anonymizing proxy, such as Tor [51], to
protect privacy against network eavesdroppers.
(c) Prio and other schemes using secret shar-
ing [30,48,56,79,86,92] offer ideal anonymity
provided that the servers do not collude.
Figure 10: Comparison of techniques for anonymizing client data in private aggregation systems.
In Prio, we deploy the standard defense against this
attack, which is to have the servers wait to publish the ag-
gregate statistic f (x1, . . . , xn) until they are confident that
the aggregate includes values from many honest clients.
The best means to accomplish this will depend on the
deployment setting.
One way is to have the servers keep a list of public
keys of registered clients (e.g., the students enrolled at
a university). Prio clients sign their submissions with
the signing key corresponding to their registered public
key and the servers wait to publish their accumulator
values until a threshold number of registered clients have
submitted valid messages. Standard defenses [3, 114, 124,
125] against Sybil attacks [52] would apply here.
The second attack is an intersection attack [20, 49, 83,
122]. In this attack, the adversary observes the output
f (x1, . . . , xn) of a run of the Prio protocol with n honest
clients. The adversary then forces the nth honest client
offline and observes a subsequent protocol run, in which
the servers compute f (x′1, . . . , x
′
n−1). If the clients’ values
are constant over time (xi = x′i ), then the adversary learns
the difference f (x1, . . . , xn)− f (x1, . . . , xn−1), which could
reveal client n’s private value xn (e.g., if f computes sum).
One way for the servers to defend against the attack is
to add differential privacy noise to the results before pub-
lishing them [54]. Using existing techniques, the servers
can add this noise in a distributed fashion to ensure that
as long as at least one server is honest, no server sees the
un-noised aggregate [55]. The definition of differential
privacy ensures that computed statistics are distributed
approximately the same whether or not the aggregate in-
cludes a particular client’s data. This same approach is
also used in a system by Melis, Danezis, and De Cristo-
faro [92], which we discuss in Section 8.
Robustness against malicious servers. Prio only pro-
vides robustness when all servers are honest. Providing
robustness in the face of faulty servers is obviously desir-
able, but we are not convinced that it is worth the security
and performance costs. Briefly, providing robustness nec-
essarily weakens the privacy guarantees that the system
provides: if the system protects robustness in the presence
of k faulty servers, then the system can protect privacy
only against a coalition of at most s − k − 1 malicious
servers. We discuss this issue further in Appendix B.
8 Related Work
Private data-collection systems [30, 48, 53, 56, 79, 86, 92]
that use secret-sharing based methods to compute sums
over private user data typically (a) provide no robustness
guarantees in the face of malicious clients, (b) use expen-
sive NIZKs to prevent client misbehavior, or (c) fail to
defend privacy against actively malicious servers [33].
Other data-collection systems have clients send their
private data to an aggregator through a general-purpose
anonymizing network, such as a mix-net [27, 32, 47, 87]
or a DC-net [31, 38–40, 110]. These anonymity systems
provide strong privacy properties, but require expensive
“verifiable mixing” techniques [8, 95], or require work
at the servers that is quadratic in the number of client
messages sent through the system [38, 121].
PrivStats [100] and ANONIZE [76] outsource to
Tor [51] (or another low-latency anonymity system [61,
88,101]) the work of protecting privacy against a network
adversary (Figure 10). Prio protects against an adversary
that can see and control the entire network, while Tor-
based schemes succumb to traffic-analysis attacks [94].
In data-collection systems based on differential pri-
vacy [54], the client adds structured noise to its private
value before sending it to an aggregating server. The
added noise gives the client “plausible deniability:” if
the client sends a value x to the servers, x could be the
client’s true private value, or it could be an unrelated
value generated from the noise. Dwork et al. [55], Shi et
al. [107], and Bassily and Smith [7] study this technique
in a distributed setting, and the RAPPOR system [57, 58],
deployed in Chromium, has put this idea into practice. A
variant of the same principle is to have a trusted proxy
(as in SuLQ [21] and PDDP [34]) or a set of minimally
trusted servers [92] add noise to already-collected data.
The downside of these systems is that (a) if the client
adds little noise, then the system does not provide much
privacy, or (b) if the client adds a lot of noise, then low-
frequency events may be lost in the noise [57]. Using
server-added noise [92] ameliorates these problems.
In theory, secure multi-party computation (MPC) proto-
cols [11, 15, 68, 90, 123] allow a set of servers, with some
non-collusion assumptions, to privately compute any func-
tion over client-provided values. The generality of MPC
comes with serious bandwidth and computational costs:
evaluating the relatively simple AES circuit in an MPC re-
quires the parties to perform many minutes or even hours
of precomputation [44]. Computing a function f on mil-
lions of client inputs, as our five-server Prio deployment
can do in tens of minutes, could potentially take an astro-
nomical amount of time in a full MPC. That said, there
have been great advances in practical general-purpose
MPC protocols of late [12,13,23,45,46,73,89,91,93,98].
General-purpose MPC may yet become practical for com-
puting certain aggregation functions that Prio cannot
(e.g., exact max), and some special-case MPC proto-
cols [5, 29, 96] are practical today for certain applications.
9 Conclusion and future work
Prio allows a set of servers to compute aggregate statis-
tics over client-provided data while maintaining client
privacy, defending against client misbehavior, and per-
forming nearly as well as data-collection platforms that
exhibit neither of these security properties. The core idea
behind Prio is reminiscent of techniques used in verifi-
able computation [16, 37, 62, 69, 97, 115, 116, 119], but
in reverse—the client proves to a set of servers that it
computed a function correctly. One question for future
work is whether it is possible to efficiently extend Prio
to support combining client encodings using a more gen-
eral function than summation, and what more powerful
aggregation functions this would enable. Another task
is to investigate the possiblity of shorter SNIP proofs:
ours grow linearly in the size of the Valid circuit, but sub-
linear-size information-theoretic SNIPs may be feasible.
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A Security definitions
In this section we define f -privacy. We give an infor-
mal definition, for the sake of readability, that captures
the security properties we need. In what follows we use
the standard notions of negligible functions and computa-
tional indistinguishability (see, e.g., [66]). We often leave
the security parameter implicit.
Definition 1 ( f -Privacy). Say that there are s servers
in a Prio deployment, and say that n clients’ values are
included in the final aggregate that the system outputs.
We say that the scheme provides f -privacy for a function
f , if for:
• every subset of at most s − 1 malicious servers, and
• every number of malicious clients m ≤ n,
there exists an efficient simulator that, for every choice of
the honest clients’ inputs (x1, . . . , xn−m), takes as input:
• the public parameters to the protocol run (all partici-
pants’ public keys, the description of the aggregation
function f , the cryptographic parameters, etc.),
• the indices of the adversarial clients and servers,
• oracle access to the adversarial participants, and
• the value f (x1, . . . , xn−m),
and outputs a simulation of the adversarial participants’
view of the protocol run whose distribution is compu-
tationally indistinguishable from the distribution of the
adversary’s view of the real protocol run.
By engaging in the protocol, the adversary learns the
value f (x1, . . . , xn−m) exactly. It is therefore critical that
the honest servers ensure that the number n −m of honest
clients’ values included in the aggregate is “large enough.”
The honest servers must use out-of-band means to ensure
that many honest clients’ values are included in the final
aggregate. See discussion of this and related issues in
Section 7.
Let SORT be the function that takes n inputs and out-
puts them in lexicographically increasing order.
Definition 2 (Anonymity). We say that a data-collection
scheme provides anonymity if it provides f -privacy, in
the sense of Definition 1, for f = SORT.
A scheme that provides this form of anonymity leaks
to the adversary the entire list of honest clients’ inputs
(x1, . . . , xn−m), but the adversary learns nothing about
which client submitted which value xi. For example, if
each client submits their location via a data-collection
scheme that provides anonymity, the servers learn the
list of submitted locations {`1, . . . , `n−m}, but the servers
learn nothing about whether honest client x or y is in a
particular location `∗.
Definition 3. A function f (x1, . . . , xn) is symmetric
if, for all permutations pi on n elements, the equality
f (x1, . . . , xn) = f (xpi(1), . . . , xpi(n)) holds.
Claim 4. LetD be a data-collection scheme that provides
f -privacy, in the sense of Definition 1, for a symmetric
function f . Then D provides anonymity.
Proof sketch. The fact that D provides f -privacy im-
plies the existence of a simulator SD that takes as
input f (x1, . . . , xn−m), along with other public values,
and induces a distribution of protocol transcripts in-
distinguishable from the real one. If f is symmetric,
f (x1, . . . , xn−m) = f (x′1, . . . , x
′
n−m), where
(x′1, . . . , x
′
n−m) = SORT(x1, . . . , xn−m).
Using this fact, we construct the simulator required
for the anonymity definition: on input (x′1, . . . , x
′
n−m) =
SORT(x1, . . . , xn−m), compute f (x′1, . . . , x
′
n−m), and feed
the output of f to the simulator SD. The validity of the
simulation is immediate. 
The following claim demonstrates that it really only
makes sense to use an f -private data collection scheme
when the function f is symmetric, as all of the functions
we consider in Prio are.
Claim 5. Let f be a non-symmetric function. Then there
is no anonymous data collection scheme that correctly
computes f .
Proof sketch. Let there be no malicious clients (m =
0). Because f is not symmetric, there exists an input
(x1, . . . , xn) in the domain of f , and a permutation pi on n
elements, such that f (x1, . . . , xn) , f (xpi(1), . . . , xpi(n)).
Let D be a data-collection scheme that implements
the aggregation function f (x1, . . . , xn). This D outputs
f (x1, . . . , xn) for all x1, . . . , xn in the domain, and hence
f (x1, . . . , xn) is part of the protocol transcript.
For D to be anonymous, there must be a simulator that
takes SORT(x1, . . . , xn) as input, and simulates the proto-
col transcript. In particular, it must output f (x1, . . . , xn).
But given SORT(x1, . . . , xn), it will necessarily fail to out-
put the correct protocol transcript on either (x1, . . . , xn) or
(xpi(1), . . . , xpi(n)). 
Robustness. Recall that each Prio client holds a value
xi, where the value xi is an element of some set of data
itemsD. For example,D might be the set of 4-bit integers.
The definition of robustness states that when all servers
are honest, a set of malicious clients cannot influence the
final aggregate, beyond their ability to choose arbitrary
valid inputs. For example, malicious clients can choose
arbitrary 4-bit integers as their input values, but cannot
influence the output in any other way.
Definition 6 (Robustness). Fix a security parameter λ >
0. We say that an n-client Prio deployment provides
robustness if, when all Prio servers execute the protocol
faithfully, for every number m of malicious clients (with
0 ≤ m ≤ n), and for every choice of honest client’s inputs
(x1, . . . , xn−m) ∈ Dn−m, the servers, with all but negligible
probability in λ, output a value in the set:{
f (x1, . . . , xn) | (xn−m+1, . . . , xn) ∈ Dm
}
.
B Robustness against faulty servers
If at least one of the servers is honest, Prio ensures that
the adversary learns nothing about clients’ data, except
the aggregate statistic. In other words, Prio ensures client
privacy if at least one of servers is honest.
Prio provides robustness only if all servers are honest.
Providing robustness in the face of faulty servers is obvi-
ously desirable, but we are not convinced that it is worth
the security and performance costs. First, providing ro-
bustness necessarily weakens the privacy guarantees that
the system provides: if the system protects robustness
in the presence of k faulty servers, then the system can
protect privacy only against a coalition of at most s−k−1
malicious servers. The reason is that, if robustness holds
against k faulty servers, then s − k honest servers must
be able to produce a correct output even if these k faulty
servers are offline. Put another way: s − k dishonest
servers can recover the output of the system even with-
out the participation of the k honest servers. Instead of
computing an aggregate over many clients ( f (x1, . . . , xn)),
the dishonest servers can compute the “aggregate” over
a single client’s submission ( f (x1)) and essentially learn
that client’s private data value.
So strengthening robustness in this setting weakens
privacy. Second, protecting robustness comes at a perfor-
mance cost: some our optimizations use a “leader” server
to coordinate the processing of each client submission
(see Appendix I). A faulty leader cannot compromise
privacy, but can compromise robustness. Strengthening
the robustness property would force us to abandon these
optimizations.
That said, it would be possible to extend Prio to pro-
vide robustness in the presence of corrupt servers using
standard techniques [10] (replace s-out-of-s secret shar-
ing with Shamir’s threshold secret-sharing scheme [106],
etc.).
C MPC background
This appendix reviews the definition of arithmetic cir-
cuits and Donald Beaver’s multi-party computation proto-
col [9].
C.1 Definition: Arithmetic circuits
An arithmetic circuit C over a finite field F takes as input a
vector x = 〈x(1), . . . , x(L)〉 ∈ FL and produces a single field
element as output. We represent the circuit as a directed
acyclic graph, in which each vertex in the graph is either
an input, a gate, or an output vertex.
Input vertices have in-degree zero and are labeled with
a variable in {x(1), . . . , x(L)} or a constant in F. Gate ver-
tices have in-degree two and are labeled with the operation
+ or ×. The circuit has a single output vertex, which has
out-degree zero.
To compute the circuit C(x) = C(x(1), . . . , x(L)), we walk
through the circuit from inputs to outputs, assigning a
value in F to each wire until we have a value on the output
wire, which is the value of C(x). In this way, the circuit
implements a mapping C : FL → F.
C.2 Beaver’s MPC protocol
This discussion draws on the clear exposition by
Smart [111].
Each server starts the protocol holding a share [x]i of
an input vector x. The servers want to compute C(x), for
some arithmetic circuit C.
The multi-party computation protocol walks through
the circuit C wire by wire, from inputs to outputs. The
protocol maintains the invariant that, at the t-th time step,
each server holds a share of the value on the t-th wire in
the circuit. At the first step, the servers hold shares of the
input wires (by construction) and in the last step of the
protocol, the servers hold shares of the output wire. The
servers can then publish their shares of the output wires,
which allows them all to reconstruct the value of C(x). To
preserve privacy, no subset of the servers must ever have
enough information to recover the value on any internal
wire in the circuit.
There are only two types of gates in an arithmetic cir-
cuit (addition gates and multiplication gates), so we just
have to show how the servers can compute the shares of
the outputs of these gates from shares of the inputs. All
arithmetic in this section is in a finite field F.
Addition gates. In the computation of an addition gate
“y + z”, the ith server holds shares [y]i and [z]i of the input
wires and the server needs to compute a share of y + z. To
do so, the server can just add its shares locally
[y + z]i = [y]i + [z]i.
Multiplication gates. In the computation of a multipli-
cation gate, the ith server holds shares [y]i and [z]i and
wants to compute a share of yz.
When one of the inputs to a multiplication gate is a
constant, each server can locally compute a share of the
output of the gate. For example, to multiply a share [y]i
by a constant A ∈ F, each server i computes their share of
the product as [Ay]i = A[yi].
Beaver showed that the servers can use pre-computed
multiplication triples to evaluate multiplication gates [9].
A multiplication triple is a one-time-use triple of values
(a, b, c) ∈ F3, chosen at random subject to the constraint
that a ·b = c ∈ F. When used in the context of multi-party
computation, each server i holds a share ([a]i, [b]i, [c]i) ∈
F3 of the triple.
Using their shares of one such triple (a, b, c), the servers
can jointly evaluate shares of the output of a multiplication
gate yz. To do so, each server i uses her shares [y]i and [z]i
of the input wires, along with the first two components of
its multiplication triple to compute the following values:
[d]i = [y]i − [a]i ; [e]i = [z]i − [b]i.
Each server i then broadcasts [d]i and [e]i. Using the
broadcasted shares, every server can reconstruct d and e
and can compute:
σi = de/s + d[b]i + e[a]i + [c]i.
Recall that s is the number of servers—a public constant—
and the division symbol here indicates division (i.e., in-
version then multiplication) in the field F. A few lines of
arithmetic confirm that σi is a sharing of the product yz.
To prove this we compute:∑
i
σi =
∑
i
(
de/s + d[b]i + e[a]i + [c]i
)
= de + db + ea + c
= (y − a)(z − b) + (y − a)b + (z − b)a + c
= (y − a)z + (z − b)a + c
= yz − az + az − ab + c
= yz − ab + c
= yz.
The last step used that c = ab (by construction of the
multiplication triple), so:
∑
i σi = yz, which implies that
σi = [yz]i.
Since the servers can perform addition and multiplica-
tion of shared values, they can compute any function of
the client’s data value in this way, as long as they have
a way of securely generating multiplication triples. The
expensive part of traditional MPC protocols is the pro-
cess by which mutually distrusting servers generate these
triples in a distributed way.
D SNIP security analysis
D.1 Soundness
We prove here that the SNIP construction of Section 4
is sound. We define soundness of the SNIP construc-
tion using the following experiment. The adversary’s
task is to produce an input x and a SNIP proof pi =
( f (0), g(0), h, a, b, c) shared amongst the servers, such that
Valid(x) , 1 and yet the servers accept x as valid. As-
sume, without loss of generality, that the output of the
Valid circuit is the value on the output wire of the last mul-
tiplication gate in the circuit, in topological order from
inputs to outputs.
Soundness. In the experiment, the adversaryA plays
the role of a dishonest client interacting with honest
servers.
1. Run the adversary A. For each server i, the
adversary outputs a set of values:
• [x]i ∈ FL,
• ([ f (0)]i, [g(0)]i) ∈ F2,
• [h]i ∈ F[x] of degree at most 2M, and
• ([a]i, [b]i, [c]i) ∈ F3.
2. Choose a random point r ←R F. For each server
i, compute [ f ]i and [g]i as in the real protocol,
and evaluate [ f (r)]i, [r · g(r)]i, and [r · h(r)]i.
3. Define the following values, where s is a con-
stant representing the number of servers:
x =
∑
i[x]i a =
∑
i[a]i
f (r) =
∑
i[ f (r)]i b =
∑
i[b]i
r · g(r) = ∑i[r · g(r)]i c = ∑i[c]i
h(M) =
∑
i[h]i(M) d = f (r) − a
e = r · g(r) − b
σ =
∑
i
(
de/s + d[b]i + e[a]i + [c]i − [r · h(r)]i)
= de + db + ea + c − h(r)
= ( f (r) − a)(r · g(r) − b) + ( f (r) − a)b
+ (r · g(r) − b)a + c − r · h(r)
= r · ( f (r)g(r) − h(r)) + (c − ab).
4. We say that the adversary wins the game if
h(M) = 1, σ = 0, and Valid(x) , 1.
Let W be the event that the adversary wins the sound-
ness game. We say that the SNIP protocol is sound if, for
all adversaries A, even computationally unbounded ones,
Pr[W] ≤ (2M + 1)/|F|,
where the probability is over the uniform choice of r in F
in Step 2. Here M is the number of multiplication gates
in the Valid circuit.
Theorem 7. The SNIP protocol of Section 4 is sound.
Proof. First, consider the probability that σ = 0, over the
choice of r in F. We can express the value of σ as the
evaluation of the following polynomial P(t) at the point r:
P(t) = t · ( f (t) · g(t) − h(t)) + (c − ab)
= t · Q(t) + (c − ab),
for some polynomial Q(t). If f · g , h, then Q is non-
zero and the polynomial P is a non-zero polynomial of
degree at most 2M + 1, no matter how Q and (c − ab)
are related. Furthermore, we know that the choice of r
is independent of (a, b, c) and Q = f · g − h, since the
adversary must produce these values in the experiment
before r is chosen. The choice of r is then independent
of the polynomial P. Since P is a non-zero polynomial of
degree at most (2M + 1), P can have at most 2M + 1 zeros
in F. This implies that the probability that P(r) = σ = 0,
for a random r independent of P, is at most (2M + 1)/|F|.
So, whenever f · g , h, Pr[W] ≤ (2M + 1)/|F|.
Let us now consider the case when f · g = h. Label the
gates in the Valid circuit in topological order from inputs
to outputs.
Claim 8. When f · g = h, the value h(t) is equal to
the output of the value on the output wire of the t-th
multiplication gate in the Valid(x) circuit.
Proof. By induction on t.
Base case (t = 1). The left and right inputs to the first
multiplication gate in the circuit are affine functions AL,1
and AR,1 of the input x. (These functions could also be
constant functions.) In constructing the polynomials f
and g in the experiment, we set:
f (1) = AL,1(x) and g(1) = AR,1(x).
Since f · g = h, we have that
h(1) = f (1) · g(1) = AL,1(x) · AR,1(x),
and h(1) is truly the value on the output wire of the first
multiplication gate in the Valid(x) circuit.
Induction step. The left and right inputs to the tth multi-
plication gate are affine functions AL,t and AR,t of x and
the outputs of all prior multiplication gates in the circuit:
(h(1), . . . , h(t − 1)). By the induction hypothesis, the val-
ues (h(1), . . . , h(t − 1)) are the values on the output wires
of the first t − 1 multiplication gates in the Valid circuit.
In constructing f and g, we set:
f (t) = AL,t(x, (h(1), . . . , h(t − 1))
g(t) = AR,t(x, (h(1), . . . , h(t − 1)).
These values are exactly the values on the left and right in-
put wires to the tth multiplication gate in the Valid circuit.
Finally, since f · g = h, we have that h(t) = f (t) · g(t), so
the value h(t) is equal to the value on the output wire of
the tth multiplication gate in the Valid circuit. 
Now, by Claim 8, when f · g = h, the value of h(M) is
the output of the Mth multiplication gate in the Valid(x)
circuit, which is actually the value on the output wire of
the circuit. (Here we assume without loss of generality
that the output value of the last multiplication gate is value
that the circuit outputs.) The probability that h(M) = 1
when Valid(x) , 1 is then zero. So, whenever f · g = h,
Pr[W] = 0.
We have shown that Pr[W] ≤ (2M + 1)/|F| no matter
whether f ·g = h. This concludes the proof of the theorem.

D.2 Zero knowledge property
In this section, we show that as long as one server is
honest, an adversary who controls the remaining servers
learns nothing about the client’s data by participating in
the SNIP verification protocol. Informally, we show that
for all x ∈ FL such that Valid(x) = 1, an adversary who
controls a proper subset of the servers can perfectly simu-
late its interaction with the honest parties (the client and
the honest servers). The simulation is generated with-
out knowledge of the client’s data x, proving that the
adversary learns nothing about the client’s data from the
protocol.
We first precisely define the notion of security that
we require from our SNIP construction. We define a
“real” world experiment, in which the adversary is given
data as in the real protocol, and an “ideal” world experi-
ment, in which the adversary is given data generated by
a simulator. We say that the SNIP protocol maintains
the zero-knowledge property if the adversary—even if
the adversary receives x as input—has no advantage at
distinguishing these two experiments.
Since the role of all servers is symmetric, and since
all values exchanged in the protocol are shared using
additive secret sharing, it is without loss of generality to
prove security for the case of a single adversarial server
interacting with a single honest server. For a value v ∈ F
we use [v]a and [v]h to denote the adversarial and honest
parties’ shares of v. Then [v]a + [v]h = v ∈ F.
In what follows, we denote the single Beaver triple that
the servers use to execute the protocol by (a, b, c) ∈ F3.
We let r ∈ F be the point that the servers use to execute
the polynomial identity test. We assume that the Valid
circuit has M multiplication gates, and that the output of
the Mth multiplication gate is the value that the circuit
outputs.
Real-world experiment. The experiment is param-
eterized by an input x ∈ FL and a point r ∈ F. The
experiment is with an adversary (A1,A2), represent-
ing the malicious server.
1. Choose random (a, b, c) ∈ F3, subject to the
constraint that a · b = c. Construct polynomials
f , g, and h over F as in the real protocol. Com-
pute f (r), g(r), and h(r). Split the values a, b, c,
x, f (0), g(0), and h into shares and compute
[d]h = [ f (r)]h − [a]h ∈ F
[e]h = [r · g(r)]h − [b]h ∈ F
msg1 =
(
[a]a, [b]a, [c]a, [x]a, [ f (0)]a, [g(0)]a,
[h]a, [h(M)]h, [d]h, [e]h,
)
.
Note that [h(M)]h is the honest server’s share
of the output wire of the Valid(x) circuit.
2. Run the first-stage adversary A1:
(stateA, [dˆ]a, [eˆ]a)← A1(x, r,msg1).
3. Compute the honest parties’ response by set-
ting dˆ = [dˆ]a + [d]h and eˆ = [eˆ]a + [e]h, and
computing
[σˆ]h = dˆeˆ/2+dˆ[b]h+eˆ[a]h+[c]h−[r·h(r)]h ∈ F.
4. Output βˆ← A2(stateA, [σˆ]h) ∈ {0, 1}.
Ideal-world experiment. This experiment is param-
eterized by an input x ∈ FL and a point r ∈ F. The
experiment is with an adversary (A1,A2) and a simu-
lator S = (S 1, S 2). The simulator is only given r ∈ F
as input.
1. Run the simulator: (stateS ,msg1)← S 1(r).
2. (stateA, [dˆ]a, [eˆ]a)← A1(x, r,msg1).
3. Run the simulator:
[σˆ]h ← S 2(stateS , [dˆ]a, [eˆ]a).
4. Output βˆ← A2(stateA, [σˆ]h) ∈ {0, 1}.
We let Expreal(x, r) and Expideal(x, r) be a random vari-
able indicating the adversary’s output in the real-world
and ideal-world experiments, respectively.
We say that the SNIP protocol is zero knowledge if
no adversary A, even a computationally unbounded one,
can distinguish the real-world experiment from the ideal-
world experiment. That is, for all x ∈ FL such that
Valid(x) = 1, and for all r < {1, . . . ,M} ∈ F, we require
that:∣∣∣ Pr[Expreal(x, r) = 1] − Pr[Expideal(x, r) = 1]∣∣∣ = 0. (2)
If the SNIP protocol satisfies this notion of security,
even if the adversary has a candidate guess x∗ ∈ F for
the client’s private value x ∈ FL (where Valid(x) = 1),
the adversary learns nothing about x by participating in
the SNIP protocol. In particular, the adversary does not
learn whether her guess was correct, because her entire
view can be simulated perfectly without knowledge of x.
Condition (2) implies a notion of semantic security: for
any two valid x0, x1 ∈ FL, the adversary’s view of the
protocol is sampled identically, whether the client uses x0
or x1 to execute the SNIP protocol.
Note that we only require the zero knowledge property
to hold when r < {1, . . . ,M}. Since we use a field F
such that |F|  2M, the probability that a uniformly
random r falls into this bad set is negligibly small. To
entirely avoid this bad event, the servers could sample
r with the constraint that r < {1, . . . ,M}, which would
increase the soundness error of the proof system slightly,
to 1/(|F| − M).
To demonstrate that our SNIP construction satisfies
the zero-knowledge property, we must produce a simu-
lator S = (S 1, S 2) that renders the adversary unable to
distinguish the real and ideal worlds.
We first describe our simulator, and then argue that the
simulation is accurate.
Simulator. The simulator S 1(r) first
• chooses random (a, b, c)←R F3, subject to the
constraint that a · b = c,
• chooses [x]a ←R FL,
• chooses f (r), g(r)←R F,
• chooses [ f (0)]a, [g(0)]a ←R F, and
• chooses [h]a ←R F[x] of degree at most 2M by
choosing coefficients at random from F.
The simulator then sets:
[h(M)]h ← (1 − [h]a(M)) ∈ F,
h(r)← f (r) · g(r) ∈ F, and
[r · h(r)]h ← r · (h(r) − [h]a(r)) ∈ F.
The simulator computes shares ([a]a, [b]a, [c]a) of
the multiplication triple, shares [ f (r)]h and [g(r)]h,
and the values
[d]h = [ f (r)]h − [a]h ∈ F
[e]h = [r · g(r)]h − [b]h ∈ F.
Finally, the simulator produces the state
state =
(
[a]h, [b]h, [c]h, [r · h(r)]h ).
and outputs(
state, ([a]a, [b]a, [c]a, [x]a,
[ f (0)]a, [g(0)]a, [h]a, [h(M)]h, [d]h, [e]h)
)
.
The simulator S 2, on input (state, [dˆ]a, [eˆ]a) com-
putes dˆ = [dˆ]a + [d]h and eˆ = [eˆ]a + [e]h, and outputs
the unique value [σˆ]h ∈ F:
[σˆ]h ← dˆeˆ/2 + dˆ[b]h + eˆ[a]h + [c]h − [r · h(r)]h.
Theorem 9. The adversary’s view in the real world is
distributed identically to the adversary’s view in the ideal
world, in which the adversary interacts with the simula-
tor S . Therefore (2) holds.
Proof. As a first step, notice that in the real world, the
values f (r) and g(r) are distributed independently and
uniformly at random, conditioned on all the information
that the adversary has at the start of the experiment. To
see this, write the value f (r) in terms of the Lagrange
interpolating polynomials (λ0(r), . . . , λM(r)):
f (r) = λ0(r) · f (0) +
M∑
i=1
λi(r) · f (i). (3)
Because the adversary knows x, it knows f (1), . . . , f (M).
However, in the real world, we choose the value of
f (0) ∈ F independently and uniformly at random. Fur-
ther, the value λ0(r) is non-zero for all r < {1, . . . ,M}.
Therefore, by (3) we have that f (r) is uniform in F and is
independent of the adversary’s view. The same argument
applies to g(r). Thus, for all relevant choices of r, f (r)
and g(r) will be distributed uniformly and independently
of the adversary’s view at the start of the experiment. The
simulator’s choices of f (r) and g(r) are then distributed
exactly as in the real world.
Next, notice that the simulation in the first flow of the
experiment of the shares of a, b, c, x, f (0), g(0), and h is
perfect, since the secret-sharing scheme perfectly hides
these values in the real world.
The simulation of the share [h(M)]h is also perfect.
Since h(M) is the value on the output wire of the Valid
circuit, and since Valid(x) = 1 for all honest clients, it
will always be true in the real world that h(M) = 1. In par-
ticular, in the real world, the value [h(M)]h that the honest
client sends satisfies [h]a(M) + [h(M)]h = 1 ∈ F always.
The simulated value preserves this equality exactly.
The simulation of the shares of d and e is also perfect,
since [d]h and [e]h are masked by [a]h and [b]h, which
are equal to
[a]h = a − [a]a and [b]h = b − [b]a,
for uniformly random values a and b unknown to the
adversary.
Now, the only remaining claim we need to argue is that
the simulation of the final value [σˆ]h is consistent with its
value in the real-world experiment. To do so, we need to
argue that, irrespective of the adversary’s choice of [dˆ]a
and [eˆ]a, and conditioned on all other values the adversary
knows, the simulated value of [σˆ]h is distributed as in the
real world.
The values that the adversary should have sent, were
it honest, in the second step of the real-world experiment
are:
[d]a = [ f (r)]a − [a]a and [e]a = [r · g(r)]a − [b]a.
Say that instead the adversary shifts these values by ∆d
and ∆e. The reconstructed values dˆ and eˆ will then also
be shifted:
dˆ = d + ∆d and eˆ = e + ∆e.
In this case, the value that the adversary receives in the
real-world experiment from the honest parties is:
[σˆ]h = dˆeˆ/2 + dˆ[b]h + eˆ[a]h + [c]h − [r · h(r)]h.
Define the corresponding adversarial share:
[σˆ]a = dˆeˆ/2 + dˆ[b]a + eˆ[a]a + [c]a − [r · h(r)]a (4)
Claim 10. We have that
[σˆ]h = f (r)∆e + r · g(r)∆d + ∆d∆e − [σˆ]a. (5)
Proof of claim. Consider the sum:
[σˆ]a + [σˆ]h = dˆeˆ + dˆb + eˆa + c − r · h(r)
= (d + ∆d)(e + ∆e) + (d + ∆d)b
+ (e + ∆e)a + ab − r · h(r)
= de + e∆d + d∆e + ∆e∆d + db
+ b∆d + ea + a∆e + ab − r · h(r)
= (de + db + ea + ab) + d∆e + e∆d
+ ∆d∆e + b∆d + a∆e − r · h(r).
As in Beaver’s protocol (Appendix C.2), r · f (r) · g(r) =
(de + db + ea + ab). Additionally, f (r) · g(r) = h(r) for all
honest clients, so
[σˆ]a + [σˆ]h = r · f (r)g(r) + d∆e + e∆d
+ ∆d∆e + b∆d + a∆e − r · h(r)
= d∆e + e∆d + ∆d∆e + b∆d + a∆e
= ( f (r) − a)∆e + (r · g(r) − b)∆d
+ ∆d∆e + b∆d + a∆e
= f (r)∆e + r · g(r)∆d + ∆d∆e.
Which proves (5). 
Now, the adversary knows ∆d and ∆e and, using the
information that the adversary has learned after the first
flow in the experiment, the adversary can compute [σˆ]a
using (4). We know, by our arguments thus far, that
1. the adversary has no information about f (r) and g(r)
at the start of the experiment,
2. the simulation of the first flow is perfect, and
3. the contents of the first flow are independent of f (r)
and g(r).
These three points together demonstrate that whatever
the adversary has learned after seeing the first flow, it
is independent of f (r) and g(r). So, ∆d, ∆e, and [σˆ]a
are independent of f (r) and g(r), and f (r) and g(r) are
independent random values.
In the real world, there are two cases:
• When ∆d = ∆e = 0, we have that [σˆ]a = −[σˆ]h.
• Otherwise, f (r)∆e + r · g(r)∆d is a random value
independent of everything else that the adversary
has seen so far. Therefore by (5), so is [σˆ]h.
Our simulation in the ideal world produces the same be-
havior. To see this, observe that the simulator computes
[σˆ]h exactly as in the real world, as long as all of the
values upon which [σˆ]h depends are distributed as in the
real world, and we have already argued that they are. This
completes the proof of the theorem. 
Why randomize the polynomials? If the client did not
choose f (0) and g(0) at random in F, that is, if the poly-
nomials f and g were completely determined by the input
x ∈ FL, then the simulation would fail. The reason is
that f (r) and g(r) would then be known to the adversary
(because the adversary knows x in the real-world exper-
iment), but the simulator (in the ideal world) would not
know x. As a result, when ∆d , 0 or ∆e , 0, the simulator
S 2 could not generate the correct [σˆ]h to satisfy (5), and
the simulation would fail. By having the client choose
f (0) and g(0) at random we ensure that f (r) and g(r) are
independent of the adversary’s view, which enables the
simulator to properly generate [σˆ]h.
This simulation failure is not just an artifact of our
proof technique: if the SNIP used non-randomized poly-
nomials f and g, a malicious server could learn non-trivial
information about x by participating in the protocol. The
idea of the attack is that a malicious verifier could, by
deviating from the protocol, learn whether Valid(xˆ) = 1,
for some value xˆ related to x. To do so, the adversary
would essentially shift its share of x to a share of xˆ and
then would execute the rest of the SNIP protocol faithfully.
To compute the shifted share of x, the adversary would
locally compute: [xˆ]a = [x]a + ∆x. (The adversary also
would need to shift its share of the polynomial h to a share
of hˆ, but this is also possible if the polynomials f , g, and
h are not randomized.) At the end of the SNIP verifica-
tion protocol, the adversary learns whether Valid(xˆ) = 1,
rather than whether Valid(x) = 1.
Leaking Valid(xˆ) to the adversary can potentially leak
all of x to the adversary. For example, if x is a single
element of F and Valid(x) tests whether x ∈ {0, 1}, then
learning Valid(xˆ), for xˆ = x + 1 leaks x entirely. That is,
if x = 0, then
Valid(xˆ) = Valid(x + 1) = Valid(1) = 1,
and if x = 1, then
Valid(xˆ) = Valid(x + 1) = Valid(2) = 0.
An adversary who can learn Valid(xˆ) can then completely
recover x. A variant of the attack allows the adversary to
test some related predicate V̂alid(x) (instead of Valid(x))
on the client’s input, which has essentially the same effect.
Randomizing the polynomials f and g prevents a ma-
licious server from learning side information about x in
this way.
E Server-side Valid computation
If the Valid predicate takes secret inputs from the servers,
the servers can compute Valid(x) on a client-provided in-
put x without learning anything about x, except the value
of Valid(x). In addition, the client learns nothing about the
Valid circuit, except the number of multiplication gates in
the circuit.
Crucially, this server-side variant only provides security
against “honest-but-curious” servers, who execute the
protocol correctly but who try to learn everything possible
about the clients’ private data from the protocol execution.
It may be possible to provide security against actively
malicious servers using a client-assisted variant of the
SPDZ multi-party computation protocol [46], though we
leave this extension to future work.
Let M be the number of multiplication gates in the
Valid circuit. To execute the Valid computation on the
server side, the client sends M multiplication triple shares
(defined in Appendix C.2) to each server, along with a
share of its private value x. Let the t-th multiplication
triple be of the form (at, bt, ct) ∈ F3. Then define a circuit
M that returns “1” if and only if ct = at · bt, for all
1 ≤ t ≤ M.
The client can use a SNIP proof (Section 4.1) to con-
vince the servers that all of the M triples it sent the servers
are well-formed. Then, the servers can execute Beaver’s
multiparty computation protocol (Section C.2) to evalu-
ate the circuit using the M client-provided multiplication
triples. The security of this portion of the protocol, with
respect to “honest but curious” servers, follows directly
from the security of Beaver’s protocol.
Running the computation requires the servers to ex-
change Θ(M) field elements, and the number of rounds
of communication is proportional to the multiplicative
depth of the Valid circuit (i.e., the maximum number of
multiplication gates on an input-output path).
F AFE definitions
An AFE is defined relative to a field F, two integers k
and k′ (where k′ ≤ k), a set D of data elements, a set
A of possible values of the aggregate statistic, and an
aggregation function f : Dn → A. An AFE scheme
consists of three efficient algorithms. The algorithms are:
• Encode : D → Fk. Covert a data item into its AFE-
encoded counterpart.
• Valid : Fk → {0, 1}. Return “1” if and only if the
input is in the image of Encode.
• Decode : Fk′ → A. Given a vector representing a
collection of encoded data items, return the value of
the aggregation function f evaluated at these items.
To be useful, an AFE encoding should satisfy the fol-
lowing properties:
Definition 11 (AFE correctness). We say that an AFE is
correct for an aggregation function f if, for every choice
of (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ Dn, we have that:
Decode
(∑
i Trunck′
(
Encode(xi)
) )
= f (x1, . . . , xn).
Recall that Trunck′(v) denotes truncating the vector v ∈
Fkp to its first k′ components.
The correctness property of an AFE essentially states
that if we are given valid encodings of data items
(x1, . . . , xn) ∈ Dn, the decoding of their sum should be
f (x1, . . . , xn).
Definition 12 (AFE soundness). We say that an AFE
is sound if, for all encodings e ∈ Fk: the predicate
Valid(e) = 1 if and only if there exists a data item x ∈ D
such that e = Encode(x).
An AFE is private with respect to a function fˆ , if the
sum of encodings σ =
∑
i Trunck′(Encode(xi)), given
as input to algorithm Decode, reveals nothing about the
underlying data beyond what fˆ (x1, . . . , xn) reveals.
Definition 13 (AFE privacy). We say that an AFE
is private with respect to a function fˆ : Dn →
A′ if there exists an efficient simulator S such that
for all input data (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ Dn, the distribution
S ( fˆ (x1, . . . , xn)) is indistinguishable from the distribution
σ =
∑
i Trunck′ (Encode(xi)).
Relaxed correctness. In many cases, randomized data
structures are more efficient than their deterministic coun-
terparts. We can define a relaxed notion of correctness
to capture a correctness notion for randomized AFEs. In
the randomized case, the scheme is parameterized by
constants 0 < δ,  and the Decode algorithm may use
randomness. We demand that with probability at least
1 − 2−δ, over the randomness of the algorithms, the en-
coding yields an “-good” approximation of f . In our
applications, typically an -good approximation is within
a multiplicative or additive factor of  from the true value;
the exact meaning depends on the AFE in question.
G Additional AFEs
Approximate counts. The frequency count AFE, pre-
sented in Section 5.2, works well when the client value
x lies in a small set of possible data values D. This AFE
requires communication linear in the size of D. When
the set D is large, a more efficient solution is to use a
randomized counting data structure, such as a count-min
sketch [36].
Melis et al. [92] demonstrated how to combine a count-
min sketch with a secret-sharing scheme to efficiently
compute counts over private data. We can make their
approach robust to malicious clients by implementing a
count-min sketch AFE in Prio. To do so, we use ln(1/δ)
instances of the basic frequency count AFE, each for a
set of size e/, for some constants  and δ, and where
e ≈ 2.718. With n client inputs, the count-min sketch
yields counts that are at most an additive n overestimate
of the true values, except with probability e−δ.
Crucially, the Valid algorithm for this composed con-
struction requires a relatively small number of multipli-
cation gates—a few hundreds, for realistic choices of 
and δ—so the servers can check the correctness of the
encodings efficiently.
This AFE leaks the contents of a count-min sketch data
structure into which all of the clients’ values (x1, . . . , xn)
have been inserted.
Share compression. The output of the count-min sketch
AFE encoding routine is essentially a very sparse matrix
of dimension ln(1/δ) × (e/). The matrix is all zeros,
except for a single “1” in each row. If the Prio client uses
a conventional secret-sharing scheme to split this encoded
matrix into s shares—one per server—the size of each
share would be as large as the matrix itself, even though
the plaintext matrix contents are highly compressible.
A more efficient way to split the matrix into shares
would be to use a function secret-sharing scheme [24,
25, 64]. Applying a function secret sharing scheme to
each row of the encoded matrix would allow the size of
each share to grow as the square-root of the matrix width
(instead of linearly). When using Prio with only two
servers, there are very efficient function secret-sharing
constructions that would allow the shares to have length
logarithmic in the width of the matrix [25]. We leave
further exploration of this technique to future work.
Most popular. Another common task is to return the
most popular string in a data set, such as the most popular
homepage amongst a set of Web clients. When the uni-
verse of strings is small, it is possible to find the most pop-
ular string using the frequency-counting AFE. When the
universe is large (e.g., the set of all URLs), this method is
not useful, since recovering the most popular string would
require querying the structure for the count of every pos-
sible string. Instead, we use a simplified version of a data
structure of Bassily and Smith [7].
When there is a very popular string—one that more
than n/2 clients hold, we can construct a very efficient
AFE for collecting it. Let F be a field of size at least n.
The Encode(x) algorithm represents its input x as a b-
bit string x = (x0, x1, x2, . . . , xb−1) ∈ {0, 1}b, and outputs
a vector of b field elements (β0, . . . , βb−1) ∈ Fb, where
βi = xi for all i. The Valid algorithm uses b multiplication
gates to check that each value βi is really a 0/1 value in
F, as in the summation AFE.
The Decode algorithm gets as input the sum of n such
encodings σ =
∑n
i=1 Encode(xi) = (e0, . . . , eb−1) ∈ Fb.
The Decode algorithm rounds each value ei either down to
zero or up to n (whichever is closer) and then normalizes
the rounded number by n to get a b-bit binary string σ ∈
{0, 1}b, which it outputs. As long as there is a string σ∗
with popularity greater than 50%, this AFE returns it. To
see why, consider the first bit of σ. If σ∗[0] = 0, then the
sum e0 < n/2 and Decode outputs “0.” If σ∗[0] = 1, then
the sum e0 > n/2 and Decode outputs “1.” Correctness
for longer strings follows
This AFE leaks quite a bit of information about the
given data. Given σ, one learns the number of data values
that have their ith bit set to 1, for every 0 ≤ i < b. In fact,
the AFE is private relative to a function that outputs these
b values, which shows that nothing else is leaked by σ.
With a significantly more complicated construction, we
can adapt a similar idea to collect strings that a constant
fraction c of clients hold, for c ≤ 1/2. The idea is to have
the servers drop client-submitted strings at random into
different “buckets,” such that at least one bucket has a
very popular string with high probability [7].
Evaluating an arbitrary ML model. We wish to mea-
sure how well a public regression model predicts a target
y from a client-submitted feature vector x. In particular,
if our model outputs a prediction yˆ = M(x), we would
like to measure how good of an approximation yˆ is of
y. The R2 coefficient is one statistic for capturing this
information.
Karr et al. [82] observe that it is possible to reduce
the problem of computing the R2 coefficient of a public
regression model to the problem of computing private
sums. We can adopt a variant of this idea to use Prio
to compute the R2 coefficient in a way that leaks little
beyond the coefficient itself.
The R2-coefficient of the model for client inputs
{x1, . . . , xn} is R2 = 1 − ∑2i=1(yi − yˆi)2/Var(y1, . . . , yn),
where yi is the true value associated with xi, yˆi = M(xi) is
the predicted value of yi, and Var(·) denotes variance.
An AFE for computing the R2 coefficient works as fol-
lows. On input (x, y), the Encode algorithm first computes
the prediction yˆ = M(x) using the public model M. The
Encode algorithm then outputs the tuple (y, y2, (y− yˆ)2, x),
embedded in a finite field large enough to avoid overflow.
Given the tuple (y,Y,Y∗, x) as input, theValid algorithm
ensures that Y = y2 and Y∗ = (y−M(x))2. When the model
M is a linear regression model, algorithm Valid can be
represented as an arithmetic circuit that requires only two
multiplications. If needed, we can augment this with a
check that the x values are integers in the appropriate
range using a range check, as in prior AFEs. Finally,
given the sum of encodings restricted to the first three
components, the Decode algorithm has the information it
needs to compute the R2 coefficient.
This AFE is private with respect to a function that
outputs the R2 coefficient, along with the expectation and
variance of {y1, . . . , yn}.
H Prio protocol and proof sketch
We briefly review the full Prio protocol and then discuss
its security.
The final protocol. We first review the Prio protocol
from Section 5. Let there be m malicious clients whose
values are included in the final aggregate. We assume that
every honest client i, for i ∈ {1, . . . , n−m}, holds a private
value xi that lies in some set of data items D. We want
to compute an aggregation function f : Dn−m → A on
these private values using an AFE. The AFE encoding
algorithm Encode maps D to Fk, for some field F and an
arity k. When decoding, the encoded vectors in Fk are
first truncated to their first k′ components.
The Prio protocol proceeds in four steps:
1. Upload. Each client i computes yi ← Encode(xi) and
splits its encoded value into s shares, one per server. To
do so, the client picks random values [yi]1, . . . , [yi]s ∈
Fk, subject to the constraint: yi = [yi]1 + · · ·+ [yi]s ∈ Fk.
The client then sends, over an encrypted and authen-
ticated channel, one share of its submission to each
server, along with a share of a SNIP proof (Section 4)
that Valid(yi) = 1.
2. Validate. Upon receiving the ith client submission,
the servers verify the client-provided SNIP to jointly
confirm that Valid(yi) = 1 (i.e., that client’s submission
is well-formed). If this check fails, the servers reject
the submission.
3. Aggregate. Each server j holds an accumulator value
A j ∈ Fk′ , initialized to zero, where 0 < k′ ≤ k. Upon
receiving a share of a client encoding [yi] j ∈ Fk, the
server truncates [yi] j to its first k′ components, and
adds this share to its accumulator:
A j ← A j + Trunck′ ([yi] j) ∈ Fk′ .
Recall that Trunck′(v) denotes truncating the vector
v ∈ Fkp to its first k′ components.
4. Publish. Once the servers have received a share from
each client, they publish their accumulator values. The
sum of the accumulator values σ =
∑
j A j ∈ Fk′ yields
the sum
∑
i Trunck′(yi) of the clients’ private encoded
values. The servers output Decode(σ).
Security. We briefly sketch the security argument for
the complete protocol. The security definitions appear in
Appendix A.
First, the robustness property (Definition 6) follows
from the soundness of the SNIP construction: as long as
the servers are honest, they will correctly identify and
reject any client submissions that do not represent proper
AFE encodings.
Next, we argue f -privacy (Definition 1). Define the
function
g(x1, . . . , xn−m) =
n−m∑
i=1
Trunck′
(
Encode(xi)
)
.
We claim that, as long as:
• at least one server executes the protocol correctly,
• the AFE construction is private with respect to f , in
the sense of Definition 13, and
• the SNIP construction satisfies the zero-knowledge
property (Section 4.1),
the only information that leaks to the adversary is the
value of the function f on the private values of the honest
clients included in the final aggregate.
To show this, it suffices to construct a simulator S that
takes as input σ = g(x1, . . . , xn−m) and outputs a transcript
of the protocol execution that is indistinguishable from
a real transcript. Recall that the AFE simulator takes
f (x1, . . . , xn−m) as input and simulates σ. Composing the
simulator S with the AFE simulator yields a simulator for
the entire protocol, as required by Definition 1.
On input σ, the simulator S executes these steps:
• To simulate the submission of each honest client, the
simulator invokes the SNIP simulator as a subroutine.
• To simulate values produced by adversarial clients, the
simulator can query the adversary (presented to the
simulator as an oracle) on the honest parties’ values
generated so far.
• The simulator must produce a simulation of the values
produced by the honest servers in Step 4 of the protocol.
Let σ be the sum of the honest clients’ encodings. For
the simulation to be accurate, the honest servers must
publish values A j such that the honest servers’ accumu-
lators sum to (1) all of the shares of encodings given
to the honest servers by adversarial clients plus (2) σ
minus (3) the shares of honest clients’ simulated encod-
ings given to adversarial servers.
Let [yi] j be the jth share of the encoding sent by client i.
Let ServA be the set of indices of the adversarial servers
and ClientA be the set of indices of the adversarial
clients. Let ServH and ClientH be the set of indices of
the honest servers and clients, respectively. Then the
accumulators A j must satisfy the relation:
∑
j∈ServH
A j = σ +
 ∑
j∈ServH
∑
i∈ClientA
[yi] j

−
 ∑
j∈ServA
∑
i∈ClientH
[yi] j
 .
The simulator can pick random values for the honest
servers’ A js subject to this constraint, since the simula-
tor knows σ, it knows the values that the honest clients’
sent to the adversarial servers, and it knows the values
that the adversarial clients sent to the honest servers.
To argue that the simulator S correctly simulates a run of
the real protocol:
• The existence of the SNIP simulator implies that every-
thing the adversarial servers see in the SNIP checking
step, when interacting with an honest client, is inde-
pendent of the honest client’s private value xi, provided
that Valid(xi) = 1. This property holds even if the ma-
licious servers deviate from the protocol in a way that
causes an honest client’s submission to be rejected by
the honest servers.
• The simulation of the aggregation step of the protocol
is perfect. In the real protocol, since the adversary sees
only s − 1 shares of each client submission, the val-
ues A j are just random values subject to the constraint
above.
Finally, anonymity (Definition 2) follows by Claim 4
whenever the function f is symmetric. Otherwise,
anonymity is impossible, by Claim 5.
I Additional optimizations
Optimization: PRG secret sharing. The Prio protocol
uses additive secret sharing to split the clients’ private data
into shares. The naïve way to split a value x ∈ FL into s
shares is to choose [x]1, . . . , [x]s−1 ∈ FL at random and
then set [x]s = x −∑s−1i=1 [x]i ∈ FL. A standard bandwidth-
saving optimization is to generate the first s − 1 shares
using a pseudo-random generator (PRG) G : K → FL,
such as AES in counter mode [85, 102]. To do so, pick
s − 1 random PRG keys k1, . . . , ks−1 ∈ K, and define the
first s− 1 shares as G(k1),G(k2), . . . ,G(ks−1). Rather than
representing the first s− 1 shares as vectors in FL, we can
now represent each of the first s − 1 shares using a single
AES key. (The last share will still be L field elements in
length.) This optimization reduces the total size of the
shares from sL field elements down to L+O(1). For s = 5
servers, this 5× bandwidth savings is significant.
Optimization: Verification without interpolation. In
the course of verifying a SNIP (Section 4.2, Step 2), each
server i needs to interpolate two large polynomials [ f ]i
and [g]i. Then, each server must evaluate the polynomials
[ f ]i and [g]i at a randomly chosen point r ∈ F to execute
the randomized polynomial identity test (Step 3).
The degree of these polynomials is close to M, where
M is the number of multiplication gates in the Valid cir-
cuit. If the servers used straightforward polynomial inter-
polation and evaluation to verify the SNIPs, the servers
would need to perform Θ(M log M) multiplications to pro-
cess a single client submission, even using optimized FFT
methods. When the Valid circuit is complex (i.e., M ≈ 216
or more), this Θ(M log M) cost will be substantial.
Let us imagine for a minute that we could fix in ad-
vance the random point r that the servers use to execute
the polynomial identity test. In this case, each server can
perform interpolation and evaluation of any polynomial P
in one step using only M field multiplications per server,
instead of Θ(M log M). To do so, each server precom-
putes constants (c0, . . . , cM−1) ∈ FM . These constants
depend on the x-coordinates of the points being interpo-
lated (which are always fixed in our application) and on
the point r (which for now we assume is fixed). Then,
given points {(t, yt)}M−1t=0 on a polynomial P, the servers
can evaluate P at r using a fast inner-product computation:
P(x) =
∑
t ctyt ∈ F. Standard Lagrangian interpolation
produces these cis as intermediate values [6].
Our observation is that the servers can fix the “random”
point r at which they evaluate the polynomials [ f ]i and
[g]i as long as: (1) the clients never learn r, and (2) the
servers sample a new random point r periodically. The
randomness of the value r only affects soundness. Since
we require soundness to hold only if all Prio servers are
honest, we may assume that the servers will never reveal
the value r to the clients.
A malicious client may try to learn something over
time about the servers’ secret value r by sending a batch
of well-formed and malformed submissions and seeing
which submissions the servers do or do not accept. A
simple argument shows that after making q such queries,
the client’s probability of cheating the servers is at most
(2M + 1)q/|F|. By sampling a new point after every
Q ≈ 210 client uploads, the servers can amortize the cost
of doing the interpolation precomputation over Q client
uploads, while keeping the failure probability bounded
above by (2M + 1)Q/|F|, which they might take to be 2−60
or less.
In Prio, we apply this optimization to combine the
interpolation of [ f ]i and [g]i with the evaluation of these
polynomials at the point r.
In Step 2 of the SNIP verification process, each server
must also evaluate the client-provided polynomial [h]i
at each point t ∈ {0, . . . ,M}. To eliminate this cost, we
have the client send the polynomial [h]i to each server
i in point-value form. That is, instead of sending each
server shares of the coefficients of h, the client sends each
server shares of evaluations of h. In particular, the client
evaluates [h]i at all of the points t ∈ {0, . . . , 2M} and sends
the evaluations [h]i(0), [h]i(1), [h]i(2), . . . , [h]i(2M) to the
server. Now, each server i already has the evaluations
of [h]i at all of the points it needs to complete Step 2 of
the SNIP verification. To complete Step 3, each server
must interpolate [h]i and evaluate [h]i at the point r. We
accomplish this using the same fast interpolation-and-
evaluation trick described above for [ f ]i and [g]i
Circuit optimization In many cases, the servers hold
multiple verification circuits Valid1, . . . ,ValidN and want
to check whether the client’s submission passes all N
checks. To do so, we have the Valid circuits return zero
(instead of one) on success. If W j is the value on the
last output wire of the circuit Valid j, we have the servers
choose random values (r1, . . . , rN) ∈ FN and publish the
sum
∑
j r jW j in the last step of the protocol. If any W j , 0,
then this sum will be non-zero with high probability and
the servers will reject the client’s submission.
